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GENDER-STEREOTYPING THEORY, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, AND IDENTITY
Carlos A. Ball*

ABSTRACT
This Article argues that the expressive components of gender-stereotyping theory
serve to delink the equality protections afforded by that theory from fixed and predetermined identity categories in helpful and positive ways. Many have viewed American
antidiscrimination law as being normatively grounded in the notion that there are
certain identities that, because of their stable and immutable characteristics, deserve
equality-based protections. Gender-stereotyping theory can help make the normative
case for a more pluralistic understanding of equality, one that is grounded in the need
to protect the fluid and multiple ways in which gender is performed or expressed rather
than focusing, as American antidiscrimination law has traditionally done, on protecting limited categories of essentialized, fixed, and finite identity categories. In short,
gender-stereotyping theory, properly understood, offers a practical way of articulating and implementing a theory of equality that does not depend on the existence of a
limited number of privileged identities. A proper understanding of gender-stereotyping
theory—one that focuses on how expressive performances of gender and sexuality identities may trigger responses by defendants that are motivated by sex stereotypes—can
help antidiscrimination law move away from the notion that plaintiffs must identify
according to certain fixed, stable, and predetermined categories in order to succeed
in their equality claims.
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B. Majority/Minority Identities and the Viability of Gender-Stereotyping
Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
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Issues related to equality and free expression intersect and interact in diverse and
multifaceted ways. Sometimes free speech and equality protections can work synergistically so that the recognition of one set of rights can expand the scope of the other set.
For example, as the respective histories of the civil rights and LGBT rights movements
show, the successful assertion of free speech rights can help to advance and promote
equality causes.1 At the same time, incorporating equality principles into free speech
doctrine—by, for instance, requiring the government to treat speakers equally regardless
of their viewpoints—helps provide robust protections for free expression.2
But the relationship between free speech and equality is not only one that helps
to expand or protect rights. It is sometimes the case that the assertion of free speech
rights can restrict equality rights, and vice versa.3 For example, the Supreme Court in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul held that promoting equality objectives by penalizing groupbased hate speech can sometimes impermissibly restrict freedom of expression.4 The
Court has also made clear, especially in the context of LGBT equality claims in cases
such as Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston5 and
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,6 that the government’s authority to promote equality
is sometimes limited by the free speech and association rights of defendants in discrimination cases.7
1

For an exploration of how the civil rights movement used the Free Speech Clause to
help attain its equality objectives, see TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE:
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 139–40 (2018). For an
early assessment of how the NAACP used free speech claims to advance racial equality goals,
see generally HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966). For an
exploration of how LGBT rights activists, in the years before and after the Stonewall riots,
relied on rights to free speech and association, which were the only rights available to them
at the time, to begin making the case for equal treatment under the law, see CARLOS A. BALL,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: A CONTENTIOUS HISTORY 15–149 (2017).
2
For a classical exploration of how the Free Speech Clause incorporates considerations
of equality, see Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment,
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 65–68 (1975).
3
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 378 (1992).
4
Id. at 391–92.
5
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
6
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
7
See id. at 654–58, 661 (upholding constitutional right of the Boy Scouts to exclude an
openly gay scoutmaster volunteer); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574–75 (upholding the constitutional
right of the organizers of the Boston St. Patrick’s Day parade to prohibit an LGBT group from
marching under its own banner). I explore the implications of these two cases for the intersection of free speech and equality principles in BALL, supra note 1, at 197–213.
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At the same time, the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize a constitutional right
shielding discrimination in commercial contexts from the application of antidiscrimination laws in cases such as Hishon v. King & Spaulding8and Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc.,9 illustrates how equality claims can sometimes limit associational
and other rights under the First Amendment.10
This Article explores additional ways in which equality and expressive rights
interact with each other by paying particular attention to gender-stereotyping theory.11
The notion that gender stereotyping constitutes a form of sex discrimination under
both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has
been widely recognized since the 1970s.12 The Supreme Court discussed the principle at length in its 1989 ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.13 The plaintiff in
Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, applied for a partnership position at the accounting
firm where she had worked for several years.14 At the time, the firm had 662 partners, only 7 of whom were female.15 Of the 88 individuals who applied for partnership positions alongside the plaintiff, she was the only woman.16 More than half of
the applicants became partners, but not Ms. Hopkins.17 The partners who denied her
the promotion deemed her to be insufficiently feminine and therefore essentially not
qualified for the new position.18 As the Court explained, “One partner described her
as ‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a woman’; a
third advised her to take ‘a course at charm school.’”19 Another partner provided
8

467 U.S. 69 (1984).
390 U.S. 400 (1968).
10
Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78 (noting that “[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but
it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections” (quoting Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973))); Newman, 390 U.S. at 402 n.5 (deeming the claim by a business that
it had a constitutional right to discriminate on the basis of race to be “patently frivolous”).
11
See discussion infra Parts I–II.
12
For an exploration of the origins of the gender-stereotyping principle in the Supreme
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, see Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle
in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 87–90 (2010). For a discussion of how the principle was a widely accepted feature of statutory sex discrimination law
at both the federal and state levels in the 1970s and 1980s, before the Supreme Court decided
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, see Brief of Emp’t Discrimination Law Scholars as Amici Curiae
in Support of the Emps. et al. at 7–15, Bostock v. Georgia, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 17-1618).
13
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). Although the principal Price Waterhouse opinion was joined by only four justices, its understanding of gender stereotyping as a form of sex
discrimination is now recognized as well-established legal doctrine. See KENJI YOSHINO,
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 156 (2006).
14
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 235.
19
Id. (citations omitted).
9
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what the Court characterized as “the coup de grace: in order to improve her chances
for partnership, [he] advised, Hopkins should ‘walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry.’”20 The Court concluded that the employer had violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for in forbidding employers
to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.21
Since the Supreme Court held in Price Waterhouse that gender stereotyping is
a form of sex discrimination under Title VII, some LGBT plaintiffs have successfully
raised statutory and constitutional sex discrimination claims based on the idea that
defendants violate equality protections when they discriminate against individuals
because of their refusal to conform to traditional gender expectations and stereotypes.22 The advent of these cases, along with the Supreme Court’s taking up of
questions related to whether and how Title VII protects LGBT individuals from
discrimination,23 makes it a particularly opportune time to explore, as I do in this
20

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 251 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
22
See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 571 (6th Cir.
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (holding that the district court “correctly determined that [the transgender plaintiff] was fired because of her failure to conform to sex
stereotypes”); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 120–22 (2d Cir. 2018), cert.
granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (holding that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of impermissible gender stereotyping under Title VII); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853
F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (concluding that same-sex sexual orientation “represents
the ultimate case of failure to conform to [gender] stereotype[s]” and that “the line between
a gender nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation . . . does not exist at all”);
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that, under the Equal Protection
Clause, “discrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity
is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the basis of sex or gender”); Prowel
v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009) (“There is no basis in the statutory
or case law to support the notion that an effeminate heterosexual man can bring a gender stereotyping claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not.”); Smith v. City of Salem,
378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual—
and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from the
discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical
terms, did not act like a woman.”). But see Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F.
App’x. 964 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (holding that sexual orientation discrimination does not constitute discrimination because of sex under Title VII).
23
See Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (granting certiorari);
21
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Article, the intersection between gender-stereotyping theory, expressive rights, and
questions of identity.
My principal contention is that the expressive components of gender-stereotyping
theory can serve to delink the equality protections afforded by that theory from finite
and predetermined identity categories in helpful and positive ways. Many have
viewed American antidiscrimination law as being normatively grounded in the
notion that there are certain identities that, because of their fixed and immutable
characteristics, deserve equality-based protections.24 Gender-stereotyping theory can
help make the normative case for a more pluralistic understanding of equality, one
that is grounded in the need to protect the fluid and multiple ways in which gender
is performed or expressed rather than focusing, as American antidiscrimination law
has traditionally done, on protecting limited categories of essentialized, fixed, and
finite identity categories.25 In short, gender-stereotyping theory, properly understood,
offers a practical way of articulating and implementing a theory of equality that does
not depend on the existence of a limited number of privileged identities. A proper
understanding of gender-stereotyping theory—one that focuses on how expressive
performances of gender and sexuality identities may trigger responses by defendants
that are motivated by sex stereotypes—can help antidiscrimination law move away
from the notion that plaintiffs must identify according to certain fixed, stable, and
predetermined categories in order to succeed in their equality claims.
American antidiscrimination law generally seeks to provide a level playing field
by prohibiting the privileging of certain identities over others (e.g., “white” over
“black,” “male” over “female,” and, in some jurisdictions, “straight” over “gay/
lesbian/bisexual”).26 But by hewing closely to an identity taxonomy that is grounded
in fixed, finite, and predetermined categories, American antidiscrimination law also
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (granting certiorari);
Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (granting certiorari). This Article went
to press before the Supreme Court issued its rulings in these cases.
24
See infra notes 93–102 and accompanying text.
25
See discussion infra Part IV.
26
It is possible, of course, to describe American antidiscrimination law in many different
ways. To choose one prominent example, such law can be understood as requiring, above all
else, “blindness” as to certain traits, such as race and gender. See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial
Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000)
(internal citation omitted) (“American antidiscrimination law typically requires employers . . .
to make decisions as if their employees did not exhibit forbidden characteristics, as if, for
example, employees had no race or sex. This is what underwrites the important trope of ‘blindness’ that ‘has played a dominant role in the interpretation of antidiscrimination prohibitions.’”).
But even if such a description is correct, it is difficult to disagree with the proposition that the
primary normative motivation behind, for example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and more recently enacted state and local laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexuality was to
address persistent discrimination against racial and sexual minorities, respectively. Even if American antidiscrimination law calls for “blindness” as to certain traits, it does so in the service
of addressing and mitigating discrimination against traditionally marginalized identity groups.
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ends up privileging those who fall into recognizable categories (e.g., those who
identify as either “male” or “female,” either “straight” or “gay, lesbian, bisexual,” or
either “cisgender” or “transgender”) over those who do not. This leaves individuals
whose racial, gender, and sexuality identities cannot be pigeonholed into such categories vulnerable to the harms engendered by discrimination. A growing number of
individuals, especially young ones, are increasingly recognizing the fluidity of gender
and sexuality categories.27 For some of these individuals, even identities that question
binarisms (such as “bisexuality” and “transgender” identities) may be unduly restrictive because they may insufficiently account for the extent to which gender and
sexuality identities are fluid and malleable (and not just nonbinary).28 A proper understanding of gender-stereotyping theory can provide antidiscrimination protections
to those who express their gender or sexuality outside of the traditional male/female,
straight/LGB, or cisgender/transgender rubrics.
It may seem odd to describe identities such as “female,” “gay/lesbian/bisexual,”
and “transgender” as privileged. These identities are clearly not privileged when compared to “male,” “straight,” and “cisgender” identities, respectively. But they are privileged when compared to gender and sexuality identities that are not (yet) easily
categorizable or recognizable because such identities may reject, for example, the
notion of defining sex/gender through considerations of who is “male” and who is
“female” or the notion that sexual orientation should be determined exclusively
through the gender-based attractions, both physical and emotional, of sexual partners.
These identities might apply to individuals, for example, who are gender fluid, gender
nonbinary, gender queer, asexual, pansexual, or polyamorous, as well as to those for
whom there is no socially recognizable identity that translates into a definable category and for whom there is therefore no “identity label” as of yet.29
It is not my contention that gender-stereotyping theory is the only way of articulating a more pluralistic understanding of equality that accounts for the variability,
fluidity, and malleability of identity categories and therefore the only theory that
offers the potential of discrimination protection to a broader swath of identities.30
27

See infra notes 278–81 and accompanying text. This Article generally focuses on gender
and sexuality categories rather than racial ones. But see infra notes 123–38 and accompanying
text (discussing the courts’ privileging of so-called immutable racial traits over perceived
discretionary racial ones). For an exploration of the practical and normative implications of
fluidity in racial identity categories, see Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? Reconciling
Multiracial Identity with Equal Protection, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1243 (2014). For an exploration
of the ongoing discrimination faced by multiracial individuals, see TANYA KATERÍ HERNÁNDEZ,
MULTIRACIALS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: MIXED-RACE STORIES OF DISCRIMINATION (2018).
28
See infra notes 278–81 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 278–81 and accompanying text. Although some gender nonbinary or
gender fluid individuals identify as transgender, some find the latter either too restrictive or
nonapplicable to them. See infra notes 278–81 and accompanying text.
30
For a recent effort to articulate an understanding of antidiscrimination principles that
offers protection to individuals heretofore left unprotected through legally mandated accommodations of a wide variety of identities that depart from those that are currently protected,

2019]

GENDER-STEREOTYPING THEORY

235

Instead, I focus on gender-stereotyping theory for three reasons. First, the theory has
been widely embraced as a matter of legal doctrine; although, as is true of many legal
doctrines, important disagreements remain as to its proper scope and application, it
is now generally accepted that gender stereotyping constitutes discrimination “because
of sex.”31 This doctrinal acceptance means that there are potential practical benefits
to exploring, as I do in this Article, the extent to which gender-stereotyping principles
can lessen the privileging of fixed, finite, and predetermined identity categories.32
Second, the theory’s expressive components make it particularly well-suited to
promote a form of equality pluralism that is more expansive than has traditionally
been provided by American antidiscrimination law and its generally rigid and deterministic focus on protecting a limited number of seemingly stable, unchanging, and
immutable identities.33 Finally, questions related to identity categories have been particularly salient in ongoing disputes involving the intersection of gender-stereotyping
theory and LGBT equality claims.34
It is important to add that the conception of gender-stereotyping theory that I articulate in this Article, which seeks to delink the equality protections afforded by that
theory from distinct identity categories, is normative rather than descriptive.35 My claim
is not that legal doctrine, as it currently stands, requires that gender-stereotyping theory
be understood in the way that I present it here. Instead, my argument is that a proper
understanding of the theory, which accounts for its crucial expressive components, can
help to delink the equality protections afforded by that theory from finite, predetermined, and seemingly immutable identity categories in helpful and positive ways.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains how the concept of gender as performance, a central component of gender-stereotyping theory, allows claims brought
under that theory to advance not only equality objectives, but ones associated with
expressive rights as well.36 This attribute of gender-stereotyping theory is important
because it means that it can protect gender performance or expression even in instances in which the Free Speech Clause does not apply because of a lack of state action. Part II explains why the viability of gender-stereotyping claims should not depend
on whether plaintiffs identify according to fixed, finite, and predetermined sex, gender,
and sexuality categories.37 It also explores the problematic ways in which a plaintiff’s
inability or unwillingness to self-identify as a sexual minority or as a transgender
person might lead some courts to fail to recognize that the policies or practices under
see generally ZACHARY KRAMER, OUTSIDERS: WHY DIFFERENCE IS THE FUTURE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS (2019).
31
See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
32
See discussion infra Part IV.
33
See discussion infra Part I and Section II.A.
34
See cases cited supra note 22.
35
See infra Section II.A.
36
See infra Part I.
37
See infra Section II.A.
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challenge constitute forms of impermissible gender stereotyping.38 Part III looks to
how some courts have applied free speech principles in gender-nonconforming cases
and critiques their linking of free speech rights to the existence of particular and
fixed sex, gender, and sexuality identities.39 Finally, Part IV explores how an understanding of gender-stereotyping theory that emphasizes its expressive components
can, consistent with free speech principles, foment the flourishing of a multiplicity
of forms of gender expression regardless of whether they are linked to or arise from
or are consistent with certain seemingly stable and predetermined identities.40
I. GENDER-STEREOTYPING THEORY AND FREE EXPRESSION
Gender-stereotyping equality principles have expressive implications. The fact that
government agencies, under the command of constitutional equal protection guarantees, and that private entities, under the command of sex antidiscrimination statutes, are
prohibited from treating employees and others differently based on how those individuals, in effect, perform their gender, provides gender-nonconforming individuals
not only with equality protections, but also with freedom of expression protections
as well.41
The idea of gender as performance was conceived and developed by the feminist
theorist Judith Butler.42 In her highly influential book, Gender Trouble: Feminism and
the Subversion of Identity, Butler argues that gender is constituted entirely through actions that have particular social meanings.43 As she explains, “[T]he action of gender
requires a performance that is repeated. This repetition is at once a reenactment and
reexperiencing of a set of meanings already socially established . . . .”44 For Butler,
gender is not a stable identity; instead, “[G]ender is an identity tenuously constituted
in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts.”45 In
other words, there is nothing to gender that stands apart from how it is performed and
from how that performance is understood as culturally cognizable markers of particular identities with specific social meanings.46
Society constantly assigns meanings to, and repeatedly polices the boundaries
of, gender actions or performances.47 As Butler explains:
38

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Part III.
40
See infra Part IV.
41
KRAMER, supra note 30, at 30 (“Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins provides the antidote to
compelled conformity. It smooths a path for people to be themselves fully and openly. The promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins is a legal means to make yourself visible.” (emphasis added)).
42
See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY (1st ed.1990).
43
See id. at viii–ix.
44
Id. at 140.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 140–41.
47
Id. at 139–40.
39
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Discrete genders are part of what “humanizes” individuals within
contemporary culture; indeed, we regularly punish those who fail
to do their gender right. Because there is neither an “essence” that
gender expresses or externalizes nor an objective ideal to which
gender aspires, and because gender is not a fact, the various acts of
gender create the idea of gender, and without those acts, there
would be no gender at all.48
The social construction of gender is occluded by what appear to be given, natural,
and essentialized gender identities. But Butler insists that there are no such identities.49 As she puts it, “There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender;
that identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to
be its results.”50
For example, we may think that when we see someone in drag, the (female) drag
is the performance that is constructed on top of the true and underlying (male) body.
But Butler posits that both of these gender identities are socially constructed because
neither is “more real” than the other.51 The phenomena of drag, like the existence of
intersex and transgender people,
question[s] the reality of gender . . . [and] put[s it] into crisis: it
becomes unclear how to distinguish the real from the unreal.
And this is the occasion in which we come to understand that
what we take to be ‘real,’ what we invoke as the naturalized knowledge of gender is, in fact, a changeable and revisable reality.52
48

Id.
Id. at 24–25.
50
Id. at 25; see also Sonia K. Katyal, The Numerus Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389,
435 (2017) (“[G]ender, according to Butler’s account, is not something natural, tangible, or
fixed, but constitutes a sort of expression that is deeply intangible and suffused through with
cultural regulation and social norms rather than biological imperative.”).
51
BUTLER, supra note 42, at xxiii (2d. ed. 1999).
52
Id.; see also id. at 175 (“In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency.”). Butler in later work more explicitly expanded
on the notion of performativity to include not just “gender,” but also “sex” as manifested in the
contestability of the material human body and its meanings. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT
MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” 2 (1993). As she explains, “[T]he fixity of
the body, its contours, its movements [is] fully material, but materiality [should] be rethought
as the effect of power, as power’s most productive effect.” Id. Butler adds that “‘[s]ex’ is,
thus, not simply what one has, or a static description of what one is: it [is instead] one of the
norms by which the ‘one’ becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within the
domain of cultural intelligibility.” Id. Katherine Franke critiques the disaggregation of “sex” from
“gender” in antidiscrimination law and policy. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (1995). For extensive explorations of the role of performance in constituting racial, gender, and sexual
49
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Butler distinguishes between gender expression and performance.53 She rejects
the concept of gender expression that is not wholly contained within the notion of
gender performance because such a concept suggests it is possible to manifest something real or essentialized about gender that is found outside of its expression.54 An
account of gender as acts of (repeated) performances is more accurate and helpful
because it reflects the absence of an underlying natural, fixed, or given identity.55 As
Butler explains,
The distinction between expression and performativeness is crucial.
If gender attributes and acts, the various ways in which a body
shows or produces its cultural signification, are performative,
then there is no preexisting identity by which an act or attribute
might be measured; there would be no true or false, real or distorted acts of gender, and the postulation of a true gender identity
would be revealed as a regulatory fiction.56
It is important to keep in mind that, from Butler’s perspective, everyone is constantly performing a gender. (It would be incorrect, under Butler’s paradigm, to say
their gender because that would suggest that gender expresses some underlying or
fixed reality.57) Gender, in other words, is defined by its performance—one that
cannot be escaped or avoided.
The concept of “performing” can conjure images of actors following scripts in
ways that sets the performers apart from routine daily life. But the concept of gender
“performance” is both more complicated and mundane than “acting.” As Sonia
Katyal explains,
At its most basic level, performance theory actively distances
itself from the idea of a clear delineation between the performances of life and the performances of art, and argues instead
that everyday life and activities both capture and enable elements that bear a stark resemblance to theatrical rendition and
orientation identities, see Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 865–75, 900–05,
919–23 (2002).
53
BUTLER, supra note 42, at 140–41.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 141 (“That gender reality is created through sustained social performances means
that the very notions of an essential sex and a true or abiding masculinity or femininity are
also constituted as part of the strategy that conceals gender’s performative character and the
performative possibilities for proliferating gender configurations outside the restricting
frames of masculinist domination and compulsory heterosexuality.”).
56
Id.
57
Id. at 140–41.
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expression. The terms “performance” and “performativity[ ]” . . .
apply to an admittedly wide range of behavior—from the most
sophisticated and stylized of rituals to the most mundane of cultural behavior.58
The gender performances of most people on most occasions go unnoticed and
unquestioned because they fail to challenge or destabilize social expectations of how
gender is supposed to be performed according to certain body and physiological
types.59 But that apparent consistency between gender performances and gender
expectations does not make the meanings of the performances any less socially
constructed or policed.60 What is different about the gender performances of most
people when compared to those of many intersex or transgender individuals, for
example, is that the latter can highlight the instability and contestability of gender
and, as such, question its coherence in ways that the former may not. As a normative
matter, Butler persuasively argues, laws and norms that demand gender coherence
demean and oppress their subjects.61
Understanding gender as acts of performance has free speech implications. Some
scholars have argued that gender performance is a form of expression protected by
the Free Speech Clause and that, therefore, the government is constitutionally restricted
58

Katyal, supra note 50, at 436–37 (footnote omitted).
Jeffrey Kosbie explains this point well when he notes that:
Most of us constantly use our behavior, mannerisms, appearance, speech,
and activities to prove that we are male or female. . . . By wearing a suit
and tie, men avoid “failing” at their gender performance. Social norms
tell us that wearing a suit and tie is masculine. Because gender structures
our whole society, most people are not aware of how they actively
participate in communicating gender.
Jeffrey Kosbie, (No) State Interests in Regulating Gender: How Suppression of Gender Nonconformity Violates Freedom of Speech, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 187, 201–02 (2013).
60
Butler makes this point as follows:
According to the understanding of identification as an enacted fantasy
or incorporation, . . . it is clear that coherence is desired, wished for,
[and] idealized . . . . [The] acts, gestures, [and] enactments [that constitute
gender] . . . are performative in the sense that the essence or identity
that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured
and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means.
BUTLER, supra note 42, at 136.
61
JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 4–6 (2004). In writing about intersex individuals,
Butler notes that “[t]he norms that govern idealized human anatomy . . . work to produce a
differential sense of who is human and who is not, which lives are livable, and which are not.”
Id. at 4. For its part, the medicalization of transgender individuals and the diagnostic criteria
for gender dysphoria diagnoses “impose[ ] a model of coherent gendered life that demeans
the complex ways in which gendered lives are crafted and lived.” Id. at 5. Butler adds that
“intersex and transsex . . . both challenge the principle that a natural dimorphism should be
established or maintained at all costs.” Id. at 6.
59
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in its ability to regulate the gender nonconformance of transgender individuals.62
Jeffrey Kosbie explains that gender nonconformity is expressive conduct protected
under First Amendment doctrine “because speakers and listeners understand the conduct as communicative.”63 He then argues that “state suppression of gender nonconformity violates core values underlying freedom of speech.”64 Kosbie explains that:
Dress, appearance, and other conduct communicate gender within
a social context that defines some behavior as “masculine” and
other behavior as “feminine.” When the state regulates gender nonconformity, it is not merely regulating conduct. By singling out
dress and appearance that deviates from these gender norms, the
state [also] suppresses communication of gender nonconformity.65
While Kosbie emphasizes government suppression of messages expressed by
transgender individuals through their gender nonconformance, Taylor Flynn focuses
on government-mandated messages.66 Flynn argues that when the state enforces gender
norms in ways that require individuals to publicly identify with a particular gender
over their objections it constitutes a form of compelled speech prohibited by the Free
Speech Clause.67 For example, when the government insists that transgender public
employees or public school students present themselves according to what is expected
given the sex they were assigned at birth regardless of how they identify according
to gender, it forces them to express themselves in ways they do not wish to do so. As
Flynn puts it, “An understanding of gender as expressive . . . helps capture an often unarticulated, yet central aspect, of the harm enforced conformity inflicts on trans
persons—compelled expression of the state’s gender message over their profound
objection.”68 In protecting transgender individuals from state oppression, Flynn “urge[s]
62

Kosbie, supra note 59, at 193–94.
Id. at 204.
64
Id. at 193.
65
Id. at 193–94 (footnotes omitted); see also Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill: Gender
Expression as Protected Speech in the Modern Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
89, 131 (2015) (“[A] transgender student’s outward expression of gender, as conveyed through
dress, hairstyle, and even restroom use, is undoubtedly intended to convey a message to outsiders
about a gender non-conforming student’s gender identity. . . . [B]ecause fitting in and being accepted are so vital to a youth’s well-being, there can be no doubt that a transgender student’s
expressive conduct is intended to, and actually does, convey a particularized message.”).
66
See Taylor Flynn, Instant (Gender) Messaging: Expression-Based Challenges to State
Enforcement of Gender Norms, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 465, 467 (2009).
67
Id. at 467 (“The focus of this Article is on compelled expression over an individual’s
objection, which is of particular concern given the state’s role as enforcer. Not only does the
state have sole authority to legally categorize people by sex, but it also uses those categories
as the basis for distributing rights and goods, such as marriage and its associated benefits,
over which it maintains a monopoly of power.”).
68
Id. at 466.
63
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an increased use of expression-based challenges [in transgender rights cases] both
because expression captures an important element of the harm to trans individuals and
because it properly directs attention to the role of the state in enforcing a selective
message about sex and gender.”69 Whether the government is suppressing gendernonconforming expression or mandating gender-conforming speech, it does so in the
service of a particular viewpoint—that gender is a binary and immutable human trait.70
Scholars such as Kosbie and Flynn have helpfully explained the ways in which
free speech claims can be used to supplement equality claims on behalf of transgender individuals.71 But there has been an insufficient recognition in the literature
of how the equality principles that serve as the foundation of gender-stereotyping
theory themselves protect expression without the need to rely on distinct free speech
principles. In other words, the equality doctrine of gender-stereotyping theory contains
within it “built-in” protections for expression. When antidiscrimination law prohibits
employers and others from relying on gender stereotypes to treat gender-nonconforming
individuals differently from gender-conforming persons, it accords those individuals
a certain degree of freedom to perform or express their gender as they deem best.72
For example, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
the government employer in Glenn v. Bumbry violated the transgender plaintiff’s
rights under the Equal Protection Clause by impermissibly relying on gender
stereotypes to terminate her employment,73 the court implicitly recognized that the
application of equal protection principles provides gender-nonconforming individuals with the right to express their gender at work in ways that limit a government
employer’s discretion to penalize them for that expression.74 The problems for the
plaintiff Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn started when she began the process of socially
transitioning genders in advance of gender-confirmation surgery.75 As part of that
process, Glenn went to work on Halloween, a day in which the employer allowed
employees “to come to work wearing costumes,” dressed in traditionally female
clothes.76 The head of the office deemed Glenn’s choice of clothing inappropriate
“‘[b]ecause he was a man dressed as a woman and made up as a woman.’”77 The
plaintiff’s boss also claimed that “‘it’s unsettling to think of someone dressed in
69

Id. at 478–79.
When the government mandates that transgender individuals express their gender
according to the sex they were assigned at birth, “[t]he state is enforcing a selective message,
which this Article refers to as ‘the ideology of the binary.’ Unsurprisingly, it reflects the prevailing view: there are two (and only two) distinct sexes with congruent gender identities, fixed
by nature and immutably different.” Id. at 466 (footnote omitted).
71
See id. at 503; Kosbie, supra note 59, at 191–92.
72
Glenn v. Bumbry, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1314.
76
Id.
77
Id.
70
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women’s clothing with male sexual organs inside that clothing,’” while adding “that
a male in women’s clothing is ‘unnatural.’”78 The Court of Appeals, in ruling for the
plaintiff, held “that a government agent violates the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination when he or she fires a transgender or transsexual
employee because of his or her gender non-conformity.”79 In doing so, the court not
only provided the transgender plaintiff with protection against discrimination, but
it also implicitly recognized that the Equal Protection Clause provided her with the
freedom to express or perform her gender at work in ways that she deemed appropriate despite her employer’s objections.80
One of the consequences of equality cases such as Glenn is that they indirectly
afford expressive rights to employees. Under the reasoning of Glenn and similar
rulings,81 employers are not permitted to penalize gender-nonconforming individuals
for the ways in which they perform their gender at work.
The fact that gender-stereotyping theory protects the expressive interests of
gender-nonconforming individuals is important for at least two reasons. First, the
proscription against gender stereotyping demanded by civil rights statutes prohibiting sex discrimination protects the expressive interests of private-sector employees,
tenants, and customers (among others), individuals who would not be protected by
the Free Speech Clause because of a lack of state action.
Even if scholars such as Kosbie and Flynn are correct (as I believe they are) that
transgender (and other gender nonconforming) individuals can benefit from bringing
claims under the Free Speech Clause to supplement equality claims, that benefit, as
a doctrinal matter, is limited to those who are in a position to challenge state action.
This is because the Free Speech Clause, of course, does not limit the discretion of private actors in the absence of state action.82 But the “built-in” protections for expressive
78

Id.
Id. at 1320.
80
See id.
81
See sources cited supra note 22.
82
See, e.g., Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (“[I]t must be remembered that the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and
assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private property used
nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.”). There are two exceptions to the state action
rule (the public function exception and the entanglement exception), neither of which seems
particularly relevant to our subject matter. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
571 (5th ed. 2017). Although the text of some state constitutional free speech provisions might
be interpreted as not requiring state action, state courts have generally followed the federal
constitutional rule mandating that such action be present before deciding whether there has
been a constitutional violation. See David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and
Encouraging Private Employee Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. 1, 34 (1998) (“[S]tate constitutions have little viability as sources of speech protections for private employees. State courts that have considered this argument have uniformly
rejected it, thereby creating an abundance of persuasive case law for other courts that may
encounter the issue in the future.”).
79
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interests that are part of a gender-stereotyping theory of equality affords expressive
rights to individuals without having to rely on constitutional free speech protections.
For example, when the self-described effeminate gay male plaintiff in Prowel
v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., sued his private employer under Title VII after he was
terminated, he could not have supplemented his equality claim with a free speech
challenge because of the lack of state action.83 Nonetheless, when the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Prowel that a gay plaintiff can proceed with
a gender-stereotyping claim,84 it implicitly afforded gender-nonconforming individuals in private workplaces with protections related to how they perform or express
their gender that they could not have received under the First Amendment.
It bears noting that the plaintiff in Prowel centered his equality claim on the
ways in which his gender expression diverged from that of other male employees
at the manufacturing plant where he worked.85 As the court explained,
In stark contrast to the other men at [the plant], Prowel testified
that he had a high voice and did not curse; was very well-groomed;
wore what others would consider dressy clothes; was neat; filed his
nails instead of ripping them off with a utility knife; crossed his
legs and had a tendency to shake his foot “the way a woman would
sit”; walked and carried himself in an effeminate manner; drove a
clean car; had a rainbow decal on the trunk of his car; talked about
things like art, music, interior design, and decor; and pushed the
buttons on the nale encoder [machine] with “pizzazz.”86
The Prowel court concluded that the plaintiff had made sufficient allegations to
raise a material issue of fact to permit a jury to decide whether the private employer
had fired him because of other employees’ negative responses to how he expressed
himself in gender-nonconforming ways.87 In doing so, the court by necessity rendered
that expression legally protected in the private workplace, albeit under equality rather
than free speech doctrine.88
It is worth noting, in a slight aside, that in cases that do involve state defendants
acting in their capacity as employers, an equality-based gender-stereotyping claim
also provides a benefit to plaintiffs not available under free speech doctrine. In free
83

579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Prowel identifies himself as an effeminate man and
believes that his mannerisms caused him not to ‘fit in’ with the other men at [work].”).
84
Id. at 292 (“There is no basis in the statutory or case law to support the notion that an
effeminate heterosexual man can bring a gender stereotyping claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not.”).
85
Id. at 286–87.
86
Id. at 287.
87
Id. at 292.
88
Id.
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speech cases involving public employees, the Supreme Court has called for the application of a balancing test that weighs the interests of government employees, in
their capacities as citizens, to speak on issues of public concern against “the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.”89 In contrast, in equal protection cases involving gender
classifications, the Court requires the application of intermediate scrutiny, which
demands that the government “establish that [such] classifications . . . serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”90 Everything else being equal, therefore, a public employee plaintiff who
expresses their gender in nonconforming ways is more likely to succeed in a genderequality claim, which places the burden on the government to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, than in a free speech claim that calls for the balancing of both sides’ interests.
The advantage of an equality claim over a free speech one may be even stronger
if the claim is brought under Title VII as opposed to the Equal Protection Clause.
This is because if intentional sex discrimination is proven under the statute, that is
usually the end of the analysis and the plaintiff prevails.91 In contrast, under the
Equal Protection Clause, intentional discriminatory conduct on the basis of sex does
not lead to a finding of a violation if the government can meet its burden of establishing the existence of a substantial governmental interest.92
In any event, the first important implication of the ways in which the equalitybased gender-stereotyping theory protects freedom of expression relates to the
availability of that protection regardless of whether the defendant is a state actor.
The second important implication is that the expressive components of genderstereotyping theory help to delink its equality protections from the existence of
fixed, finite, and predetermined identity categories. As I explore in the remainder
of the Article, this delinking of equality from such categories is beneficial because
it allows for a more expansive and capacious understanding of equality than one that
seeks, first, to classify and then, second, to protect individuals according to rigid and
preset categories of sex, gender, and sexuality identities.
89

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
91
See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (“If the evidence
consists of direct testimony that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive, and the trier
of fact accepts this testimony, the ultimate issue of discrimination [under Title VII] is proved.”
(quoting Lewis v. Smith, 731 F.2d 1535, 1537–38 (11th Cir. 1984))). But see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e)(1) (2018) (providing that Title VII “is not violated in those certain instances
where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise”).
92
Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1321 (citation omitted) (“If this were a Title VII case, the analysis
would end [with the finding of intentional discrimination]. . . . However, because [the plaintiff’s]
claim is based on the Equal Protection Clause, we must, under heightened scrutiny, consider
whether [the defendant] succeeded in showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification.’”).
90
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II. GENDER-STEREOTYPING THEORY AND IDENTITY CATEGORIES
The concept of identity has been a double-edged sword for progressives. On the
one hand, the notion of fixed identities helps with organizing and mobilizing as individuals come together around perceived shared racial, gender, or sexuality traits (among
others) to collectively pursue political and legal objectives. Some of the most important
social movements in the United States of the last century—from the civil rights to
the women’s rights to the LGBT rights movements—were organized around shared
traits—from skin color to assigned sex to sexual orientation—that were understood
by movement members and others to constitute defining or essential characteristics of
individuals.93 A focus on distinct identities has led, among other things, to the enactment of hundreds of federal, state, and local laws prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of traits that are understood to define or determine those identities.94 As Zachary
Kramer succinctly puts it, “Civil rights law is in the business of identity. No area of law
cares more about who a person is than civil rights law. Indeed, the entire enterprise rests
on the idea that certain identities deserve special protection against discrimination.”95
On the other hand, the prioritization of identity categories has engendered certain
paradoxes and created certain limitations. For example, it is somewhat paradoxical to
claim that particular traits are central to individuals’ ability to define themselves while
at the same time contending that those same traits should be deemed largely irrelevant
for the purpose of setting public policies. In addition, left critics have objected to the
ways in which identity politics essentialize racial, gender, and sexual orientation
identities by viewing them as natural or predetermined, that is as existing independently of social contexts and understandings.96 As many left theorists have noted, the
boundaries of identity categories are themselves subject to much contestation.97
93

For an exploration of the role of twentieth century social movements centered on
notions of identity, see, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based
Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062,
2064 (2002).
94
See generally id.
95
KRAMER, supra note 30, at 39.
96
Judith Butler has been one of the most important and influential critics of identity politics.
As Sonia Katyal notes,
Antidiscrimination advocates, [Butler] argued, subverted many of the
interests of their movement by relying on clearly demarcated categories
of gender, sex, or sexuality. Thus, instead of normalizing or essentializing
same-sex sexual desires or conduct into categories that suggest that they
are fundamental, immutable aspects of human identity, which is the traditional strategy of lesbian and gay rights activists, Butler argued that
gay rights advocates should seek to challenge, rather than replicate, the
concept of gender altogether.
Katyal, supra note 50, at 437–38 (footnote omitted).
97
See, e.g., id. at 399 (“An account of gender performance suggests that gender is not
something tangible, or fixed, but constitutes a sort of expression that is intangible, borderless,
and suffused through cultural regulation and social norms rather than ‘biological’ imperative.”).
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From this critical perspective, racial, gender, and sexuality categories and understandings are nothing more than the byproduct or representation of that contestation.
Left critics repeatedly remind us that while identity politics depend on the stability,
continuity, and universality of identity traits, those identities are social constructions
that are malleable, fluid, and contestable.98
Critics have also complained that identity-based conceptions of what norms
such as justice and equality demand have tended to articulate and defend understandings of identities that are largely binary (e.g., individuals are either people of
color or white, female or male, transgender or cisgender, and gay/lesbian or straight)
and fixed (i.e., individuals do not shift from one identity to another).99 And yet, the
sorting of individuals into pre-existing, binary, and fixed categories can help to
make the normative case for antidiscrimination protection.100 A basic version of that
argument is as follows: “X and Y (e.g., gay and straight) are two identities associated
with trait Z (e.g., sexual orientation). Smith was born with Y identity. Government
officials, private employers, and landlords traditionally prefer those with X identity.
Therefore, the law should protect Smith from discrimination on the basis of trait Z.”
Once there is a normative consensus that discriminating on the basis of certain traits
is wrong because those attributes are thought to be both essential to people’s identity
and largely beyond their control, then the argument for discrimination protection on the
basis of those traits seems clear and is largely accepted across the political spectrum.101
98

See, e.g., Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 89 (2008) (“Gender’s regulatory effectiveness in our culture largely stems from biologically essentialist understandings
of the production of gender identity. By creating the appearance that gender identity is rooted in
biology, biological essentialism casts the primary means of gender perpetuation, the category
of ‘sex,’ as outside the realm of social construction as an aspect of one’s pre-social self.”).
99
See, e.g., Laura Grenfell, Embracing Law’s Categories: Anti-Discrimination Laws and
Transgenderism, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 52 (2003) (“One of the effects of establishing
and maintaining categories of difference and identity is to make these differences (of one’s
identity) concrete rather than fluid. Thus differences become abstracted from their context
of shifting social relationships. Another effect is to make these identities appear natural and
immutable.”); see also KRAMER, supra note 30, at 66 (“From top to bottom, civil rights law
is nothing more than a rigid system of boxes. To find shelter in the law, victims of discrimination must fit themselves into a box. The boxes are discrete and defined, fixed and unbending.
Each box houses a trait, and the existence of the box means that the trait receives protection
against discrimination.”).
100
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, WE THE PEOPLE: A PROGRESSIVE READING OF THE
CONSTITUTION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 80–81 (2018) (“The recognition of the
importance of equality as a basic constitutional value, in part, is about fundamental fairness. It
is wrong to treat a person differently from others similarly situated—especially if it is on the basis
of immutable characteristics like race, sex, or sexual orientation—without a sufficient reason.”).
101
See, e.g., Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151 (1992) (“Many people, at least
when first asked, respond that basing discrimination on immutable traits such as race or gender
is what makes discrimination wrong.”).

2019]

GENDER-STEREOTYPING THEORY

247

At the same time, the notion that the traits that define people’s most important
identities are largely binary and fixed elides crucial complicating factors. For example, the existence of multiracial, intersex, bisexual, gender fluid, gender nonbinary,
and transgender individuals (among others) shows that many individuals fall along
continuums of race, sex/gender, and sexual orientation that resist easy, simplistic,
and rigid “either/or” categorizations. While the prioritization of a finite number of
agreed identities sometimes helps to attain a modicum of protection from discrimination for some individuals, such prioritization also reinforces and strengthens binary
and essentialized understandings of identities in ways that render other stigmatized
individuals invisible and unprotected under the law.102
This part of the Article explores questions of identity as they relate to genderstereotyping theory. Section II.A explains why the viability of gender-stereotyping
claims should not depend on whether plaintiffs identify in ways that fall under fixed,
finite, and predetermined sex, gender, and sexuality identity categories.103 Section
II.B explores the problematic ways in which a plaintiff’s inability or unwillingness
to self-identify as a sexual minority or as a transgender person might lead some
courts to fail to recognize the existence of impermissible gender stereotyping.104
A. The Non-essentiality of Identity Categories in Gender-Stereotyping Theory
One of the crucial attributes of gender-stereotyping theory is the way in which
it can, when properly understood, delink equality and antidiscrimination protections
from the existence of seemingly natural and pre-existing identity categories. This
102

Jessica Clarke has helpfully distinguished between “old immutability” claims grounded
in the idea that certain traits are morally blameless (and therefore improper bases for discrimination) and “new immutability” claims based on the notion that some personal characteristics,
“while entailing some degree of choice, ought not be blameworthy.” Jessica A. Clarke, Against
Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 10 (2015) (footnote omitted). Clarke argues that:
[T]he new immutability’s focus on valued traits leaves out many stigmatized identities—identities that might have the strongest claims to
protection precisely because judgments based on them are superficial and
perpetuate systemic subordination. . . . Even worse, to argue a trait is fundamental to personality is to bolster the argument that it cannot change.
Id. at 11 (footnotes omitted).
Clarke adds that:
The new immutability’s protections for “personhood” exclude the most
stigmatized, and its underlying premises reinforce stereotypes. Practically, the new immutability fails to give courts a principled basis for
distinguishing between those traits that deserve protection and those
that do not. It cannot justify transformative interventions into discriminatory social practices, and it invites conflicting equality claims.
Id. at 12.
103
See discussion infra Section II.A.
104
See discussion infra Section II.B.
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delinking is possible because how plaintiffs identify according to particular sex,
gender, and sexuality identities should not be dispositive in assessing the viability of
a gender-stereotyping claim. For example, Ann Hopkins, the female plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse who was turned down for the partnership position because her bosses
deemed her to be insufficiently feminine,105 did not have to allege anything related
to her sexuality or gender identity in order to prevail in her antidiscrimination case. In
other words, the fact that Hopkins, as far as the litigation was concerned, presented
herself as a cisgender and heterosexual person did not prevent her from winning her
case.106 Hopkins should have prevailed regardless of her sexual orientation and gender
identity. This is because gender-stereotyping theory, properly understood, focuses
on the assumptions that defendants make based on how individuals perform their
gender without requiring that plaintiffs fit into certain pre-existing identity categories. As long as defendants impermissibly take into account the ways in which plaintiffs
express their gender, plaintiffs are entitled to antidiscrimination protection regardless
of how they identify according to gender or sexuality markers.107
It could be argued that even if Hopkins would have prevailed regardless of
whether she identified as lesbian, straight, or bisexual, on the one hand, or cisgender
or transgender on the other, how she identified according to sex categories (man or
woman) was a crucial aspect of her discrimination claim. After all, the accounting
firm’s partners deemed her unqualified for the promotion because they believed she
was too masculine for a woman.108 But it is not at all clear that being a woman was
crucial to Hopkins’s claim; it is likely that had Hopkins self-identified as a man after
having been assigned the female gender at birth, the partners would have denied him
the promotion because they would have deemed him to be “too feminine” for a man.109
105

See supra notes 13–21 and accompanying text.
Ann Hopkins provided her life story, and her perspective on her career and lawsuit against
Price Waterhouse, in ANN BRANIGAN HOPKINS, SO ORDERED: MAKING PARTNER THE HARD
WAY (1996).
107
See Zachary A. Kramer, Of Meat and Manhood, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 287, 318 (2011)
(“When a court considers a gender-stereotyping claim, the court should judge the claim based
not on the plaintiff’s identity, but on whether the alleged discrimination was motivated by
stereotypical gender expectations.”).
108
See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
109
The ruling in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati supports the idea that gender-stereotyping
claims should not depend on whether the plaintiff identifies as a man or as a woman. 401 F.3d
729 (6th Cir. 2005). Barnes was a transgender police officer who was denied a promotion to
sergeant. Id. at 733. After Barnes sued on gender-stereotyping grounds, the defendant claimed
that the plaintiff lacked standing under both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause because,
inter alia, the officer “was not a member of a protected class.” Id. at 737. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected that argument by noting that the plaintiff was in fact “a
member of a protected class—whether as a man or a woman.” Id. at 739 (emphasis added). The
same court has made clear in other rulings involving Title VII claims brought by transgender
plaintiffs that the viability of a gender-stereotyping claim does not depend on whether the
106
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In the end, Hopkins should have prevailed in her Title VII claims regardless of whether
she identified as a man or a woman, or as straight or lesbian or bisexual or queer, or as
cisgender or transgender because her expressed gender nonconformance, as perceived
and understood by the male partners who decided not to grant her the promotion, did
not depend on her self-identification according to any of those identity categories.110
It is worth adding that Hopkins should have prevailed in her gender-stereotyping
claim even if she had identified as gender nonbinary, that is as neither male nor female.
This is because it is likely that the partners would have responded in gender stereotypical ways to someone who expresses their sex/gender in ways that reject the very
categories of “man” and “woman.” Stereotypical understandings of gender categories—the idea that there are certain attributes, talents, and interests that are distinctly
male and others that are distinctly female—are premised on the foundational notion that
everyone should fit into one of the two categories. If Hopkins was denied a promotion because she was a “masculine woman,” then it is reasonable to assume that she
also would have been denied the promotion if she had expressed her sex/gender in
ways that purposefully rejected the very categories of “man” and “woman.”111
The performative aspects of gender-stereotyping theory help highlight the crucial
distinction between, on the one hand, how a defendant in a discrimination case
plaintiffs, for purposes of the litigation, identify as male or female. Compare Smith v. City of
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding gender-stereotyping claim by transgender plaintiff who was socially transitioning from male to female and who identified as male
for purposes of the litigation), with EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884
F.3d 560, 572–74 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (upholding genderstereotyping claim by transgender plaintiff who was socially transitioning from male to female
and who identified as female in the lawsuit).
110
Cf. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding, in upholding a gender-stereotyping claim, that it did not “matter[ ] for purposes of Title VII liability
whether the [defendant] withdrew its offer of employment because it perceived [the plaintiff] to
be an insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or an inherently gendernonconforming transsexual”).
111
Jessica Clarke has noted that the Obama Administration “explicitly extended” the
“logic” that discrimination against someone who is transgender is a form of sex discrimination because it constitutes gender stereotyping to include “protection for nonbinary gender
identity [by] promulgating regulations that clarify that ‘[sex] stereotypes can include the
expectation that individuals will consistently identify with only one gender.’” Jessica A.
Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 924 (2019) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 92.4
(2017) (defining sex stereotypes in Department of Health and Human Services regulations
interpreting the Affordable Care Act)). In her article, Clarke provides a revelatory exploration of bias against gender-nonbinary individuals. Id. at 910–13. As Clarke explains,
“[N]onbinary people may encounter mistreatment for a variety of reasons, including disbelief
in nonbinary identity, erasure of nonbinary experiences, dehumanization of those who do not
fit conventional gender categories, concern that nonbinary people will undermine traditional
gender roles, and politicization of nonbinary identity in a time of increasing polarization.”
Id. at 910.
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perceives a plaintiff’s gender expression and, on the other, whether a plaintiff selfidentifies according to predetermined and easily recognizable sex, gender, and sexual
orientation categories.112 In this sense, identity matters not because it has any intrinsic,
fixed, or immutable meaning, but because it might affect the ways in which the defendant imbues the gender performance with certain gender-based assumptions regarding
attributes, talents, and interests. Gender-stereotyping theory, properly understood,
focuses on the assumptions that defendants make based on how individuals perform
their gender without requiring that plaintiffs self-identify according to certain seemingly
stable, unchanging, and predetermined sex, gender, and sexuality categories.113
It is important to emphasize that to claim that plaintiffs in gender-stereotyping
cases do not have to identify according to certain fixed, finite, and predetermined
sex, gender, and sexuality markers does not mean that how they identify is necessarily
irrelevant to the claim. The concept of gender as a performance includes within it
both the notion of a “performer” and that of an “audience.” In other words, as Butler
makes clear, gender performance always takes place within particular social contexts
that give the performance its meaning.114 For this reason, the sex, gender, or sexual orientation identity of the gender-stereotyping claimant might be relevant to the discrimination claim because it might color the ways in which the defendant attached
meaning to the plaintiff’s gender performance. For example, the fact that an employer
knows that an employee self-identifies as a lesbian woman or as a transgender man can
be an important aspect of the gender-stereotyping claim given that the negative employment decision may have been made because some employers have certain stereotypical gender expectations centered on notions such as that a lesbian is not “a real
woman” because of her attraction to other women or that a transgender man is not “a
112

The Supreme Court has explained that what matters in disparate treatment cases under
Title VII is a defendant’s “motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.” EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015). What ultimately matters, in
other words, is why a defendant made an adverse employment decision vis-à-vis the plaintiff
and not what the defendant knew about the plaintiff. This meant, in the religious discrimination case of Abercrombie & Fitch, that the fact that the prospective employer did not know
that the plaintiff engaged in a religious practice that needed to be accommodated was irrelevant
as long as the need for a religious accommodation was one of the reasons for the adverse
employment decision. As the Court explained,
Motive and knowledge are separate concepts. An employer who has
actual knowledge of the need for an accommodation does not violate
Title VII by refusing to hire an applicant if avoiding that accommodation
is not his motive. Conversely, an employer who acts with the motive of
avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no more
than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed.
Id.
113
See Katyal, supra note 50, at 435 (“[T]he performative dimensions of gender suggest
that, instead of thinking of gender as a type of fixed identity, one should view it as more akin
to intellectual property—permeable, unfixed, malleable, and ultimately expressive.”).
114
See supra notes 44–52 and accompanying text.
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real man” because he has “female chromosomes” and was assigned the female sex
at birth. But the important point, for our purposes, is that in order to succeed with
the gender-stereotyping claim, the plaintiff should not have to identify according to
fixed, finite, and predetermined sex, gender, and sexuality categories.
To put it differently, the fact that the plaintiff in Glenn v. Bumbry identified as
transgender115 and that the plaintiff in Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., identified as gay116 (to focus on two cases discussed in Part I) undoubtedly helped both
individuals make out their gender-stereotyping claims.117 The ways in which the
plaintiffs’ supervisors and co-employees understood their gender performances were
colored by the plaintiffs’ gender identity (transgender) and sexual orientation (gay),
respectively.118 But the crucial point is that, given the plaintiffs’ acts of gender nonconformance in their workplaces, they should have prevailed regardless of whether
they identified in ways that allowed, first, employers and, later, courts to place them
into easily recognizable identity categories.
Although the ascribed meanings of gender performances might be colored by the
ways in which plaintiffs self-identify, what ultimately should matter is the extent to
which defendants engage in gender stereotyping in response to those performances
rather than whether the plaintiffs fall into certain fixed, finite, and predetermined
identity categories.119 If the gender performances in question trigger sex-based
discriminatory motives on the part of employers, it should not matter whether those
performances are linked to widely recognized identities. This understanding of genderstereotyping theory allows employees and others to receive equality protections for
expressing their sex, gender, and sexuality in ways that fall outside of traditional
identity categories. In doing so, it potentially provides protection for individuals who,
for example, refuse to identify along the male/female, straight/LGB, or cisgender/transgender axes. Gender-stereotyping theory, in other words, allows for variability and
malleability in expressing identities outside of those traditional rubrics. I return to
this point in Part IV.120
An understanding of gender-stereotyping theory that, by emphasizing its expressive
components, seeks to render particular predetermined identities as non-essential to
the claim—as opposed to an understanding of the theory that makes its applicability
dependent on particular categories of self-identification—also helps avoid a seemingly
intractable problem: how to distinguish between performances that are “true” manifestations of an underlying identity and those that are not. Writing about the limits of
115

663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009).
117
See supra notes 72–80, 83–88 and accompanying text.
118
See supra notes 72–80, 83–88 and accompanying text.
119
I say “should” because some courts, after Price Waterhouse, refused to allow LGBT
plaintiffs to proceed with gender-stereotyping claims on the ground that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of either sexual orientation or gender identity. See infra notes
141–44 and accompanying text.
120
See infra Part IV.
116
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prioritizing identity performance in antidiscrimination law, Gowri Ramachandran
explains the problem as follows:
The fact that identity performance is so contextual and complex
makes it hard, if not impossible, to formulate legal rules for protecting identity performance under the traditional equality-based
rubrics of antidiscrimination law. To do so would require isolating which identity performances constitute the performance of
a protected identity category and which do not. . . . This is a task
that is not only difficult, but one that risks turning good intentions into racist or sexist essentialist assertions. Deciding which
actions do and do not “count” as part of a protected identity will
inevitably privilege the claims of those who behave in conformance with dominant group norms over the claims of those who
are dissenters: Painting a red dot in the center of my forehead
would most likely “count” as a performance of my ethnicity and
gender (South Asian woman), but dyeing my hair red would most
likely not “count.” This trades the orthodoxy of assimilation for
the orthodoxy of identity politics.121
An expressive understanding of gender-stereotyping theory that seeks to disconnect the theory from whether the claimant seeking its protection has performed
their gender in ways that match particular and recognizable identities (such as “female”
or “gay” or “transgender”) renders irrelevant the question of whether the performance
is linked to or arises from or is consistent with predetermined identities. What matters
is how the performance is understood by others given the social context in which it
takes place, rather than whether it represents or manifests a “true identity” that is separate or independent from the performative acts that constitute the identity in question.122
121

Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing,
Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 23–24 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
122
Taylor Flynn has noted the delinking of antidiscrimination protections from identity
categories that comes with viewing the gender nonconformance of transgender individuals
through a free speech as opposed to equality lens. Flynn, supra note 66, at 485. As she puts
it, “Because First Amendment claims are predicated on the expression of views rather than directly based in identity, there is at least less of a doctrinal (as opposed to pragmatic) drive to
prove the underlying ‘truth’ or reality of one’s views” than in equality cases. Id. But, as I argued
in Part I, the expressive components that are internal to gender-stereotyping theory by themselves encourage that delinking without needing to rely on free speech doctrine as an independent
basis for protection. See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text. As I noted there, the
internal expressive components of gender-stereotyping theory have important practical implications because they provide some protection for expression in the private sphere that
cannot be provided by the First Amendment because of the state action requirement. See supra
notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
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This aspect of gender-stereotyping theory can help ameliorate—though not, on its
own, completely overcome—a perennial limitation of American antidiscrimination
law, that is the way in which it seeks to distinguish between those aspects of identity
that are immutable—and therefore “true” and seemingly worthy of protection—and
those that are chosen—and therefore discretionary and purportedly unworthy of
protection.123 As Kenji Yoshino points out in his exploration of the concept of forced
assimilation of racial, gender, and sexuality identities that requires individuals to
“cover” those identities, the emphasis on immutability serves to occlude prejudice
against the ways in which individuals express or perform their identities.124 One of
the cases that Yoshino relies on to defend his thesis is Rogers v. American Airlines,
in which a federal court refused to find that an employer violated Title VII’s proscription against racial discrimination when it prohibited employees from wearing
all-braided hairstyles.125 After an African-American employee who wanted to wear
braids at work sued the employer, the court concluded that the grooming policy did
not violate Title VII.126 In doing so, the court distinguished between characteristics
that are immutable (such as “natural hair growth”) and those that are “easily changed”
(such as hair braids).127 Because the court deemed the braids to fall under the latter
category and the choice of hairstyle to be of minor importance, it concluded that the
employer’s hair policy did not constitute discrimination under Title VII.128
In 2016, thirty-five years after Rogers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions relied on the same reasoning
to reject a discrimination claim brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against an employer that rescinded a job offer to an African-American candidate after she refused to cut her dreadlocks.129 The court held that “Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on immutable traits, and the proposed amended complaint does
not assert that dreadlocks—though culturally associated with race—are an immutable
characteristic of black persons.”130 The court proceeded to explain that while Title
VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of “black hair texture (an immutable characteristic),” the statute does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of “black hairstyle”
because it is not immutable.131
123

There is an extensive literature critiquing the role of immutability in American equality
law. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 102; Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics
of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994).
124
Yoshino explores the issue of covering extensively. See generally YOSHINO, supra note
13; Yoshino, supra note 52.
125
527 F. Supp. 229, 232–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
126
Id. at 232.
127
Id.
128
Id. (“[A]n all-braided hairstyle . . . is not the product of natural hair growth but of
artifice.”).
129
852 F.3d 1018, 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2016).
130
Id. at 1021.
131
Id. at 1030.
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These cases reflect the extent to which a focus on immutability leads to troubling distinctions that have nothing to do with what should matter most in a disparate treatment case: whether the defendant improperly took the protected trait into
account in making the decision subject to challenge. Indeed, one of the problems
with the reasoning of cases such as Rogers and Catastrophe Management Solutions,
as Yoshino succinctly points out, “is that it scants the performative dimension of
race.”132 The courts’ approach allowed them to dismiss the discrimination claim
without grappling with why the employers applied their grooming policies in ways
that prohibited African-American employees from wearing their hair in a manner
that expressed their racial heritage in particular ways.133 Rather than focusing on the
employer’s motivations and understandings triggered by the plaintiffs’ racial performances, the courts made questionable distinctions based on the purported differences between racial performances that arise from immutable characteristics (such
as those associated with “black hair texture”) and those that purportedly do not (such
as those associated with braids).134 Trying to distinguish between “true” performances
of underlying immutable characteristics (such as wearing “black hair texture” in the
form of an Afro)135 and “discretionary” performances that lack a sufficiently close
connection to immutable characteristics would seem to be a paradigmatic example
of a fool’s errand.136
132

Yoshino, supra note 52, at 892.
Yoshino perceptively argues that:
What’s frustrating about the Rogers opinion, and what’s flawed about the
Title VII jurisprudence generally, is that it does not force [the employer]
to answer [the] question [of why it prohibited the wearing of hair braids
at work]. Instead, the court only looked at Rogers’s capacity to conform.
Once the court determined that she could assimilate, it assumed she could
do so, without regard to the legitimacy of the demand for assimilation.
YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 136. It bears noting that Yoshino’s notion of forced assimilation
through employer-mandated coverings of identity performances is in some ways the reverse
of what is at issue in many gender-stereotyping cases: In instances of forced covering, employees are penalized for performing their identities in ways that are both (1) consistent with and
emanate from their identities and (2) socially stigmatized. In contrast, in the traditional genderstereotyping case, the stigma attaches as a result of the employees’ refusal to perform their
gender in ways that society believes are consistent with and emanate from their identities.
Id. at 158. In other words, and to put it simply, the plaintiff in Rogers was penalized for being
“too black,” while the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was penalized for being “insufficiently
female.” See id. at 136; Yoshino, supra note 52, at 892. Yoshino refers to the latter as “reversecovering demands.” YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 155, 158.
134
Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 852 F.3d at 1030.
135
The court in Catastrophe Management Solutions noted that while a prohibition on dreadlocks does not violate Title VII, a prohibition on Afros does. Id. (first citing Jenkins v. Blue
Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 168 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc); then citing Rogers
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
136
As Camille Gear Rich has argued,
The courts’ focus on the biological/voluntary distinction is fundamentally
unprincipled and illogical, as the discriminatory animus in cases involving
133
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Courts in the hair-braiding cases and similar rulings,137 unlike what is called for
by a proper understanding of gender-stereotyping theory, have focused on the extent
to which the challenger’s racial or gender performances are grounded in immutable
characteristics (e.g., Afro vs. braids) without bothering to expand the analytical lens
to include the crucial question of how an employer understands, responds, and gives
meaning to those performances. It seems to me that a proper understanding of
gender-stereotyping theory can help courts avoid the perilous exercise of trying to
distinguish between performative acts that, on the one hand, appear to judges to
truly reflect a plaintiff’s underlying fixed, predetermined, and immutable identity
and, on the other, performances that do not. This is because gender-stereotyping
theory, properly understood, asks judges to do precisely what the courts refuse to do
in cases such as Rogers and Catastrophe Management Solutions: focus on the social
meanings of the performances, and how they might lead defendants to adopt stereotypical understandings of the plaintiffs’ protected traits, rather than on whether the
performances represent or manifest “true” and “immutable” identities that are
separate or distinct from the performative acts that constitute those identities.138
Professor Kimberly Yuracko has criticized what she deems to be a libertarian
reading of gender-stereotyping theory, one that
requires protection for all forms of gender expression—those that
are stereotypical, atypical, and idiosyncratic; those that are persistent; and those that are transient. Under this view, gender becomes
so-called biological racial or ethnic traits and voluntary, performed racial
or ethnic traits operates identically. In these two kinds of cases, the employer discriminates against the employee because she has triggered a
cultural code associated with a low-status race or ethnic group. In both
types of cases, the employer sanctions the employee because of a fear
of racial or ethnic presence: The employee’s appearance reminds the
employer of the employee’s minority status and her potential to disrupt
the current cultural hegemony of the workplace.
Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the
Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1141–42 (2004); see also D. Wendy Greene, Title
VII: What’s Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got to Do with It?, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1355, 1365 (2008) (“Throughout American history, skin color has been used to determine
an individual’s race, but it has not served as the sole marker of one’s race. Distinguishable
physical markers signifying ‘whiteness’ and ‘non-whiteness’ generated the creation of a hierarchical social system based on race and color, whereby whiteness represented the superior status
and non-whiteness the inferior.”).
137
See, e.g., Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (upholding employer’s sex-specific grooming standard as it relates to hair length because “hair
length is not an immutable characteristic, for it may be changed at will”); see also Pecenka
v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800, 805 (Iowa 2003) (upholding employer’s firing of
male employee because he wore an ear stud after noting that “[w]earing an ear stud is not an
immutable characteristic”).
138
See generally Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 852 F.3d 1018; Rogers, 527 F. Supp. 229.
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whatever people say it is. As gender becomes solely a matter of
self-identification, the distinction between gender and personal
idiosyncrasy becomes one of mere nominalism, and all conduct
becomes potentially entitled to protection.139
A critic of my understanding of gender-stereotyping theory could make a similar
claim by arguing that if the equality protection at issue is unmoored from stable,
distinct, and predetermined identity categories, then any claim of gender expression
by any person becomes protected. But that would not be the case because, under my
proposed analysis, the key is whether the defendant understands, responds, and
gives meaning to the expressive performances in gender stereotypical ways. If the
plaintiff’s expression, to use Yuracko’s terms, is so “atypical,” “idiosyncratic, and
“transient” that it does not trigger gender stereotypical responses by the defendant,
then no liability would attach.140 The requirement, in equality cases, that there be a
gender stereotypical response to the plaintiff’s expressive gender performance limits
the number of cases in which liability will attach.
Until relatively recently, most courts that grappled with the question of whether
sexual minorities and transgender individuals could bring gender-stereotyping
claims were so focused on seemingly fixed and predetermined identities that they
139

Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 757, 770–71 (2013) [hereinafter Yuracko, Soul of a Woman]. Yuracko raises
the same concern in KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW
143–45 (2016).
140
Yuracko, Soul of a Woman, supra note 139, at 770. The existence of gender stereotyping
would also not lead to discrimination liability if there was no differential treatment of employees. This addresses another of Yuracko’s concerns: that an expansive understanding of genderstereotyping theory that broadly protects gender expression would prohibit, for example, a
law firm from requiring its litigators to be “aggressive” and elementary schools from requiring
its teachers to be “nurturing” because the former trait is a stereotypically male one and the
latter a stereotypically female one. See id. at 773 (using these examples and others to argue
that “[p]rohibiting employers from requiring conduct that is traditionally gendered would force
employers to restructure jobs so as to fit employees’ preferred gender expressions—such accommodations would be costly and, in some cases, impossible”). But employers’ application
of these personality requirements would not violate gender-stereotyping theory as long as the
requirements applied equally to all employees. This means that while a law firm, for example,
could require that all of its litigators be “aggressive,” it could not require its female litigators
(but not its male lawyers) to be “aggressive” while also evincing traits whose expression is
traditionally associated with femininity. Furthermore, if the gender-nonconformance claim, in
a case involving the government as employer, is grounded in free speech considerations as
opposed to equality ones, the balancing of the employee’s expressive interests against the legitimate interests of the public employer called for by Pickering would limit the number of
cases in which plaintiffs prevail. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In
addition, to the extent that the free speech claim is based on expressive conduct, the doctrinal
requirement that the expressed message be understood by others will also serve to limit the
number of successful claims. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
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nonsensically concluded that the assertion of such identities precluded the raising
of viable gender-stereotyping claims. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reasoned in a Title VII case from 2005 that “[w]hen utilized by an
avowedly homosexual plaintiff, . . . gender-stereotyping claims can easily present
problems for an adjudicator. This is for the simple reason that stereotypical notions
about how men and women should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas
about heterosexuality and homosexuality.”141 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit made a similar point when it warned in 2006 that “a gender stereotyping claim
should not be used to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.”142
Rather than focusing on the extent to which the defendants might have impermissibly assigned meaning to the plaintiffs’ gender performances in stereotypical
ways, these courts focused only on the plaintiffs’ asserted identities.143 They then
relied on those identities to conclude that the gender-stereotyping claims represented
nothing more than efforts to gain antidiscrimination protection for LGBT-identifying
individuals from sources of law, such as Title VII, that do not explicitly proscribe
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.144 This reasoning
leads to the following strange (and identity-driven) result: while straight cisgender
individuals are free to raise a gender-stereotyping claim in trying to establish that
the employer discriminated “because of sex,” LGBT individuals are precluded from
raising the same claim because of the ways in which they self-identify. The effect of
this reasoning is to make open LGBT individuals, in effect, the only people in the
United States who are precluded, seemingly as a matter of law, from bringing a
gender-stereotyping claim.
More recently, however, courts have tended to reject the notion that the mere
self-identification of plaintiffs as sexual minority or transgender individuals renders
their sex discrimination/gender-stereotyping claims nonviable.145 As the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit put it in the Prowel case from 2009, the defendant
cannot persuasively argue that because [the plaintiff] is homosexual, he is precluded from bringing a gender stereotyping claim.
There is no basis in the statutory or case law to support the notion
141

Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218–19 (2d Cir. 2005), overruled by
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599
(2019) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted); see also Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana,
Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *5–6 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (rejecting
gender-stereotyping claim brought by transgender plaintiff).
142
Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 452 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006). The Sixth Circuit has
recently questioned the continued viability of Vickers on this point. See EEOC v. R.G. &
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 580 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct.
1599 (2019).
143
Vickers, 452 F.3d at 764.
144
Id.
145
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2004).
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that an effeminate heterosexual man can bring a gender stereotyping claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not.146
The court proceeded to explain that as long as a reasonable jury could conclude,
based on the evidence presented, that harassment or discrimination occurred “because
of sex,” it was impermissible to reject the plaintiff’s gender-stereotyping claim as
a matter of law because of his sexual orientation.147
Rather than focusing the judicial lens on the purportedly “disqualifying” nature
of some plaintiffs’ identities, courts in some of the more recent cases have tended
to look to how those identities are socially understood from a gender-stereotyping
perspective.148 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, a 2017 Title VII case involving
a lesbian plaintiff,
Viewed through the lens of the gender non-conformity line of
cases, [the plaintiff] represents the ultimate case of failure to
conform to the female stereotype (at least as understood in a
place such as modern America, which views heterosexuality as
the norm and other forms of sexuality as exceptional): she is not
heterosexual. . . . [The plaintiff’s] claim is no different from the
claims brought by women who were rejected for jobs in traditionally male workplaces, such as fire departments, construction,
and policing. The employers in those cases were policing the
boundaries of what jobs or behaviors they found acceptable for
a woman (or in some cases, for a man).149
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made a similar point in 2018
when it concluded in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., a Title VII case involving a
gay man, that
[a]pplying Price Waterhouse’s reasoning to sexual orientation,
[means] that when, for example, “an employer . . . acts on the
basis of a belief that [men] cannot be [attracted to men], or that
[they] must not be,” but takes no such action against women
146

Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009).
Id.; see also Smith, 378 F.3d at 575 (“Sex stereotyping based on a person’s gender nonconforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior;
a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has
suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”).
148
See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc);
see also Zarda v. Altitude Express Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S.
Ct. 1599 (2019).
149
853 F.3d 339, 346.
147
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who are attracted to men, the employer “has acted on the basis
of gender.”150
What mattered to these courts was the ways in which employers (and the
broader society) assign gender stereotypical meanings to the plaintiffs’ identities.151
This emphasis does not render the identities irrelevant, but it does make clear that
what ultimately matters is how employers imbue those identities with certain stereotypical gender meanings rather than the “immutable” or “true” characteristics of
those identities.
It could be argued that cases such as Zarda and Hively undermine my argument
that gender-stereotyping theory can lessen the importance of identity categories in
antidiscrimination law since the cases can be understood to stand for the proposition
that anyone who identifies as gay or lesbian, and who has been treated unequally by
an employer on that basis, can make out a successful Title VII claim because of the
gender stereotyping that inevitably impacts sexual minorities.152 But, as I have noted,
my argument is not that identity considerations should be irrelevant in assessing the viability of a gender-stereotyping claim. Instead, I contend that plaintiffs should not have
to identify according to a finite number of fixed and predetermined identity categories
in order to bring a successful gender-stereotyping claim. The appellate courts’ rulings
in Zarda and Hively are consistent with my understanding of gender-stereotyping theory because they focus on the social meanings ascribed to the identities in question.153
It will be up to the Supreme Court to decide whether the claims accepted by
courts in cases such as Zarda and Hively manifest correct understandings of Title
VII’s ban on discrimination “because of sex.”154 But regardless of how the Court rules
on that question of statutory interpretation, the cases illustrate the ways in which a
proper understanding of gender-stereotyping theory—one that focuses on how expressive performances of gender and sexuality identities may trigger responses by
defendants that are motivated by sex stereotypes—can help antidiscrimination law
move away from the notion that plaintiffs’ must identify according to certain fixed,
stable, and predetermined categories in order to succeed in their equality claims.
150

883 F.3d 100, at 120–21 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250
(1989) (alteration in original)).
151
See, e.g., id. at 157; Hively, 853 F.3d at 346.
152
See, e.g., Zarda, 883 F.3d at 128; Hively, 853 F.3d at 347.
153
See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 120–21; Hively, 853 F.3d at 344–46.
154
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, to decide
whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation constitutes discrimination “because
of sex” under Title VII. 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (granting certiorari); see also Bostock v. Clayton
Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (same). The Court has also granted certiorari in R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, a case that raises the question of whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals based on either their status as transgender
people or on gender-stereotyping grounds under Price Waterhouse. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
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B. Majority/Minority Identities and the Viability of Gender-Stereotyping Claims
Some of the recent LGBT Title VII cases show how the fact that a plaintiff is
LGBT may help courts recognize gender stereotyping engaged in by defendants.155
But, unfortunately, the opposite may also be the case: some judges might equate a
plaintiff’s lack of self-identification as a sexual minority or as a transgender person
with the absence of a viable gender-stereotyping claim. In other words, while the fact
that plaintiffs, under some of the recent cases noted above, identify as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgender might help them make out a successful gender-stereotyping
claim because such identification explains how and why defendants assigned stereotypical meanings to the gender performances in question,156 the fact that other
plaintiffs identify (or seem to identify) as straight and cisgender might lead some
judges to fail to recognize the existence of impermissible gender stereotyping.
This failure of seeing may in part help to explain the troubling outcome in the
infamous case of Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Company, Inc.157 In that case, the
employer (Harrah’s, a Las Vegas casino) had recently instituted a grooming policy
that required female bartenders to wear makeup while on the job.158 The plaintiff
objected to the new requirement, pointing out that she had successfully worked at
the casino as a bartender for many years without wearing any makeup.159 The makeup
requirement was part of a broader grooming policy that had some components that
applied equally to men and women, and others that depended on the employee’s
gender.160 All of the casino’s “Beverage Service Personnel,” for example, were prohibited from having “faddish hairstyles or unnatural [hair] colors.”161 But only male
bartenders were prohibited from having hair “extend below [the] top of [the] shirt
collar” and “ponytails.”162 Female bartenders, unlike male ones, were required to have
their hair “teased, curled, or styled every day you work.”163 In addition, male bartenders
were prohibited from wearing makeup, while female ones were required to do so.164
The plaintiff found the makeup requirement to be offensive and unnecessary, and
she eventually left her job.165 She later sued arguing that the employer’s makeup requirement for women violated Title VII because it constituted impermissible sex stereotyping.166 A majority of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
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164
165
166

See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119–22; Hively, 853 F.3d at 340–46.
See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119–22; Hively, 853 F.3d at 342–46.
444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
Id. at 1107.
Id. at 1106–07.
Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1108.
Id.
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banc, rejected the notion that a condition of employment that required women to
wear makeup constituted illegal gender stereotyping.167 The court distinguished Price
Waterhouse by reasoning that in that earlier Supreme Court case, “[i]mpermissible
sex stereotyping was clear because the very traits that [Hopkins] was asked to hide
were the same traits considered praiseworthy in men.”168 The Ninth Circuit explained that “Jespersen’s claim . . . materially differs from Hopkins’ claim in Price
Waterhouse because Harrah’s grooming standards do not require Jespersen to conform
to a stereotypical image that would objectively impede her ability to perform her job
requirements as a bartender.”169 The court added that in order to prevail, Jespersen
would have to prove that the grooming policy imposed an undue burden on women as
a class that it did not impose on men.170 The court concluded that summary judgment
for the employer was appropriate after it refused to take judicial notice of the fact
that women have to spend more time and money in order to comply with a makeup
requirement than men have to spend in keeping their hair short.171
The Jespersen ruling has been subject to withering criticism in law reviews.172
The court simply could not get itself to accept the seemingly obvious proposition
167

Id. at 1111–12.
Id. at 1111.
169
Id. at 1113.
170
Id. at 1110.
171
Id. at 1111 (“Having failed to create a record establishing that the [grooming] policies are
more burdensome for women than for men, Jespersen did not present any triable issue of fact.”).
172
See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining
Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1134 (2006) (contending
that Jespersen’s “unequal burdens analysis, which allows appearance codes that equally burden
men and women . . . . invites silly and utterly subjective comparisons”); Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes
Don’t Make the Man (or Woman), but Gender Identity Might, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90,
90 (2006) (noting that Jespersen “reflects the blinders on many contemporary courts regarding
the impact of sex-differentiated dress requirements on female employees” (footnotes omitted));
see also Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 210–11 (2007) (“[T]he court . . . did not
consider the possibility that by subjecting only women to this socially-derived ritual, the employer was enforcing, and the court was sanctioning, a type of physical branding or differentiation of female employees that serves to reinforce both the male behavioral norm and the
traditionally dominant role enjoyed by men (and the correspondingly subordinate position
ascribed to females) in the market place.” (footnote omitted)). For an early and cogent critique
of employers’ regulation of employees’ appearance, see Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing:
Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395 (1992). Klare argued that:
[O]fficial appearance standards denigrate cultural and religious diversity
and enforce conformity to white, heterosexual, Christian images of beauty
and proper grooming. The rules and standards both exploit and repress
female sexuality and punish women who depart from (largely) malecreated expectations about proper female behavior and roles. Perhaps the
central social function of appearance regulation is to maintain the sexual
subordination of women to men.
Id. at 1398.
168
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that when employers demand that female employees abide by certain expectations
of how women should perform their gender, including how they should powder their
faces and color their lips in ways that traditionally have been associated with proper
femininity, they engage in precisely the type of gender stereotyping that Price
Waterhouse proscribes.173 As one of the dissents explained,
Harrah’s regarded women as unable to achieve a neat, attractive,
and professional appearance without the facial uniform designed
by a consultant and required by Harrah’s. The inescapable message
is that women’s undoctored faces compare unfavorably to men’s,
not because of a physical difference between men’s and women’s
faces, but because of a cultural assumption—and gender-based
stereotype—that women’s faces are incomplete, unattractive, or
unprofessional without full makeup. We need not denounce all
makeup as inherently offensive . . . to conclude that requiring
female bartenders to wear full makeup is an impermissible sex
stereotype and is evidence of discrimination because of sex.174
Taylor Flynn has argued that the result in cases such as Jespersen is explained
by what she calls the “pink on pink” phenomenon:
The impediment for the court, I argue, is that make-up wearing
for women is so ubiquitous—such a part of the background—
that its coerced expression, along with its power to objectify, are
rendered invisible. As the dissent noted, “If you are used to wearing makeup—as most American women are—this may seem like
no big deal.” The majority appears unable to conceptualize makeup wearing as subordinating precisely because it is something
that many of their wives, daughters, sisters, mothers (or, if female,
perhaps themselves) wear routinely. The majority, in effect, is
trying to read pink lettering against a pink background.175
As Flynn notes, “It may at first seem paradoxical that gender claims (whether based
in equality or expression) by non-trans plaintiffs at times fare worse than those by persons who are trans-identified.”176 But that result makes sense once we understand
173

See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1104, 1115.
Id. at 1116 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
175
Flynn, supra note 66, at 501 (quoting Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117–18 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted)).
176
Id. at 500. In making an argument that overlaps somewhat with Flynn’s “pink on pink”
theory, Jennifer Levi asserts that the failure of discrimination claims in cases such as Jespersen
is explained by
174
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that a plaintiff’s self-identification as transgender (or as a sexual minority) might
avoid or lessen the blinding effects of the “pink on pink” phenomenon by encouraging
courts to probe more rigorously an employer’s motivations for making negative employment decisions against gender-nonconforming individuals and to inquire further
about the harmful consequences of those decisions on marginalized minorities.
It is important in this regard to emphasize that Jespersen did not raise issues
related to her sexual orientation or gender identity in her lawsuit.177 As a result, it is
reasonable to believe that the court perceived her to be both straight and cisgender.
But if Jespersen had identified as a lesbian or as a transgender person, it is entirely
possible that a majority of the court would have been more open to recognizing the
ways in which the makeup requirement impermissibly was grounded in gender
stereotyping.178 In other words, if Jespersen had identified as a lesbian or a transgender employee, such an identification, by itself, would likely have raised questions
about (1) the employer’s understandings of what it means to be a “true woman”; (2)
whether and, if so, why Jespersen met or failed to meet those understandings; and
(3) the harmful impact of the understandings on distinct minorities.179
“the collective hunch theory.” Under this theory, even if there are some
individuals harmed by certain gender-based requirements, courts refuse
to conclude that the imposition of gender-based requirements could be
actionable, particularly when imposed on non-transgender individuals.
The collective hunch is that gender requirements, especially those concerning dress and appearance, are acceptable, and should survive challenge in most circumstances.
Levi, supra note 172, at 93. Jespersen is only one of several cases in which courts have upheld
the legality of sex-differentiated grooming standards. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t
Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a challenge to a policy that prohibited
men, but not women, from having long hair); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753,
755–56 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that requiring male, but not female, employees to wear ties was
not sex discrimination under Title VII); see also Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400,
401 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that a grooming code that established different hair-length limits
for male and female employees did not violate Title VII because failure to comply with the
code resulted in the same consequences for both men and women).
177
See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1104.
178
It is telling, in this regard, that when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
was confronted with a transgender plaintiff’s sex stereotyping claim in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., it explicitly rejected the defendant’s contention that the reasoning
in Jespersen should lead the court to rule against the plaintiff. 884 F.3d 560, 574 (6th Cir. 2018),
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (citing Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113) (rejecting “the
Jespersen court’s suggestion that sex stereotyping is permissible so long as the required conformity does not ‘impede [an employee’s] ability to perform her job’”).
179
Jennifer Levi argues that successful transgender rights cases “reflect[ ] the fact that the
courts could imagine the specific harm a transgender litigant might experience from forced conformity to gender norms.” Levi, supra note 172, at 101–02 (footnote omitted). Levi posits that
transgender equality claims are less threatening to judges than those raised in cases such as
Jespersen “because courts have been able conceptually to marginalize the impact of their decisions to a minority community (of transgender persons), [making it] easier for them to allow
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That this is the case is reflected in the fact that courts in recent years have increasingly accepted the notion that discrimination against LGBT individuals constitutes
a form of per se impermissible gender stereotyping. In the context of transgender
plaintiffs, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained
that “discrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual—and therefore fails to
act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from the discrimination
directed against Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms,
did not act like a woman.”180 The same court in a later case added that “[t]here is no
way to disaggregate discrimination on the basis of transgender status from discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity, and we see no reason to try.”181
Although we will never know for sure, it is possible that had Jespersen identified
as a lesbian or as a transgender person, the Ninth Circuit judges who voted to deny
her claim might have been more attuned to the employer’s efforts to use gender-based
grooming standards as a means of policing gender performances and boundaries in
ways that violated Price Waterhouse. In other words, a challenge to a mandatory,
gender-based grooming policy brought by a self-identified lesbian or transgender
plaintiff, for example, might have led a majority of the court to recognize the employer’s makeup requirement for what it was: a misguided and illegal effort to force
female employees to abide by stereotypical understandings of how women in a
hospitality job must perform their gender in order to please customers.
Part of the problem with challenges to sex-differentiated grooming policies brought
by seemingly cisgender and straight plaintiffs is that courts seem to believe that there
is no group-based harm.182 As the Jespersen court explained, “The record contains
nothing to suggest the grooming standards would objectively inhibit a woman’s
ability to do the job. The only evidence in the record to support the stereotyping claim
is Jespersen’s own subjective reaction to the makeup requirement.”183 According to the
court, in other words, the employer’s makeup requirement did not violate Title VII
some small incursion into widely-held beliefs about the fundamental differences between men
and women.” Id. at 103–04.
180
Smith v. City of Salem, 387 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2008).
181
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 576–77; see also Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019)
(“Applying Price Waterhouse’s reasoning to sexual orientation, we conclude that when, for
example, ‘an employer . . . acts on the basis of a belief that [men] cannot be [attracted to men],
or that [they] must not be,’ but takes no such action against women who are attracted to men,
the employer ‘has acted on the basis of gender.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted));
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[T]he line
between a gender nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation . . . does not exist
at all.”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A person is defined as
transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender
stereotypes. . . . There is thus a congruence between discriminating against transgender and
transsexual individuals and discrimination on the basis of gender-based behavioral norms.”).
182
See, e.g., Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112.
183
Id.
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because it did not negatively affect the plaintiff as a member of a class (i.e., as a
woman), but as an individual who had a “subjective” objection to the requirement.184
There are at least three problems with this reasoning. First, as Jennifer Levi has
pointed out, Title VII does not require the showing of a group-based harm when the
challenged policy, on its face, treats individuals differently according to their sex.185
Such cases represent the paradigmatic form of sex discrimination because but for the
plaintiff’s sex, they would not have been subjected to the policy in question.186
Second, the conclusion that there is no group-based harm is entirely dependent
on how the court defines the group in question. By dismissing Jespersen’s objections
as idiosyncratic—as the majority put it, the case was “limited to the subjective reaction
of a single employee”—the court assumed that most women do not believe they
would be harmed by such a requirement and that, therefore, most female employees
would not object to being forced to wear makeup as a condition of employment.187
184

As the court explained,
We respect Jespersen’s resolve to be true to herself and to the image
that she wishes to project to the world. We cannot agree, however, that
her objection to the makeup requirement, without more, can give rise to
a claim of sex stereotyping under Title VII. If we were to do so, we would
come perilously close to holding that every grooming, apparel, or appearance requirement that an individual finds personally offensive, or
in conflict with his or her own self-image, can create a triable issue of
sex discrimination.

Id.
185

Levi explains this point as follows:
In a classic dress code case, such as Jespersen, the plaintiff loses her
job for refusing to comply with a dress code that requires her to conform
her outward appearance to a certain standard simply because she is a
woman. Under the most straightforward analysis of discrimination, firing
this employee because she failed to conform her outward appearance
is termination “because of sex”—had she been a man, she would not
have been fired. Few, if any, logical leaps need be made to understand
the claim or how it fits within Title VII’s direct evidence model.
Jennifer L. Levi, Misapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 353, 376 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
186
It is interesting to note, on the question of “but for” discrimination, that some courts in
Title VII cases involving LGBT plaintiffs have accepted the claim that discrimination on the
basis of gender identity and sexual orientation constitutes both impermissible gender stereotyping
and so-called per se discrimination on the basis of sex. See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d 560, 571–78 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019);
Zarda v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100, 116–24 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599
(2019); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303–08 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Baldwin
v. Foxx, E.E.O.C. Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641,*5, *7 (July 15, 2015) (concluding both that “sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based consideration’” and that “sexual
orientation discrimination is also sex discrimination because it necessarily involves discrimination based on gender stereotypes”).
187
See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113.
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But assuming arguendo that the court’s presumption was correct, there are still some
women, even if they are in a minority, who would, like Jespersen, object to being
forced to wear makeup as a condition of employment—a makeup requirement would
negatively affect that group of women. As Levi explains, “[F]or persons like Darlene
Jespersen, whose employers’ expectations of how they should look and act depart
from their internalized sense of how they should look and act, the harms associated
with gender-based dress codes are quite severe.”188
Third, and most importantly for our purposes, the expressive components of
gender-stereotyping theory make the search for a group-based harm unnecessary.
This is because, as explored further in the next section, showing that a defendant
burdened the plaintiff’s expressive interests does not require, either as a matter of
doctrine or logic, that the plaintiff first demonstrate that they belong to a particular
identity group.189 The crucial point for our purposes is the following: an employer’s
gender-based policies or practices may constitute impermissible gender stereotyping
under Title VII regardless of how a particular plaintiff challenging them identifies
according to sex, gender, and sexuality markers.
It may seem odd to say that how Jespersen identified according to sex, in particular, should not have determined the lawsuit’s outcome given that the main question
to be decided was whether the employer discriminated “because of sex.”190 But that
indeed would have been the case. Let’s suppose Jespersen had identified as a man.
If the employer agreed with that self-identification, then it would not have required
Jespersen to wear makeup (the requirement only applied to women) and there would
have been no litigation. But if the employer had disagreed with Jespersen’s self-identification as a man and considered him to be a woman, it would have required him
to wear makeup, a requirement that would have raised the same issues of gender
stereotyping as Jespersen’s actual lawsuit. In the end, therefore, what matters is the extent to which the employer was motivated by gender stereotyping given how Jespersen
performed her gender without the aid of makeup rather than whether she identified according to certain predetermined identity categories, including those related to sex.191
The degree of gender stereotyping behind the employer’s makeup requirement
in Jespersen remained precisely the same regardless of whether it was applied, for
example, to a self-identified female heterosexual cisgender employee or to a female
lesbian transgender worker. The focus of the analysis should be on the purpose and
effect of the policy, and how it may reflect impermissible gender stereotyping, rather
than on whether the person challenging the policy falls under one or more specific
and predetermined identity categories.
188

Levi, supra note 185, at 367.
See discussion infra Part III.
190
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
191
See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text (explaining why the outcome in Price
Waterhouse would have been unaffected if the plaintiff had self-identified as a man rather
than a woman, or as neither).
189
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III. GENDER-NONCONFORMING SPEECH AND IDENTITY
It is in some ways not surprising, given the central role that identity-based claims
play in American antidiscrimination law, that courts in equality gender-stereotyping
cases have prioritized the existence or non-existence of particular sex, gender, and
sexual orientation identities. This focus on identity has helped some LGBT plaintiffs
in some cases.192 But it has also unfortunately served to obscure viable (if not
compelling) gender-stereotyping claims in cases such as Jespersen.193
It is perhaps more surprising to find a similar judicial emphasis on particular
identities in free speech disputes involving gender nonconforming expressive conduct.194 Perhaps this emphasis is explained by the fact that these cases implicate not
just questions of free speech, but usually also ones related to equality and discrimination against LGBT individuals.195 But regardless of the reason, a judicial prioritization of particular identity categories, as I explore in this Part, is as problematic and
unnecessary in assessing the viability of free speech/gender-stereotyping claims as
it is in assessing that of equality/gender stereotyping ones.
Like many teenagers who identify as female, fifteen-year-old Pat Doe liked to
attend school wearing clothes and fashion accouterments associated with the female
gender.196 However, administrators at her public school in Brockton, Massachusetts,
objected to her doing so because they deemed her to be a boy given that she had
been assigned the male sex at birth.197 School officials prohibited Doe from attending school while wearing “any outfits disruptive to the educational process, specifically padded bras, skirts or dresses, or wigs.”198 According to the administrators, Doe’s
wearing of so-called girls’ clothing and fashion accouterments was “disruptive or
distractive to the educational process.”199 Doe sued the school district in state court
claiming, inter alia, that it had violated her rights to free speech and to be free from
gender discrimination as guaranteed by the state constitution.200
In deciding whether to grant the plaintiff a preliminary injunction that would permit
her to attend school wearing the clothing and accouterments of her choice while the
lawsuit was pending, the trial court in Doe v. Yunits held that Doe was likely to prevail
in her free speech claim.201 In doing so, the court concluded that the case raised
issues of symbolic speech (sometimes referred to as expressive conduct).202 The
threshold question in such cases is whether the symbolic acts at issue constitute
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
See supra notes 157–92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 196–237 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 196–237 and accompanying text.
Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000).
See id. at *4–5.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3–5.
Id. at *3.
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“speech” within the meaning of constitutional protections.203 Following Supreme
Court precedents interpreting the First Amendment, the Doe court noted that “[s]ymbolic acts constitute expression if the actor’s intent to convey a particularized message
is likely to be understood by those perceiving the message.”204 For the court the
answer to that question was a clear “yes” because of the plaintiff’s gender identity.205
After pointing out, in the ruling’s first paragraph, that Doe had “been diagnosed with
gender identity disorder,” the court explained that the
[p]laintiff in this case is likely to establish that, by dressing in
clothing and accessories traditionally associated with the female
gender, she is expressing her identification with that gender. In
addition, plaintiff’s ability to express herself and her gender identity through dress is important to her health and well-being, as
attested to by her treating therapist. Therefore, plaintiff’s expression is not merely a personal preference but a necessary symbol
of her very identity.206
What is puzzling about the court’s reasoning is not that it found the plaintiff’s gender identity relevant to the question of whether she intended to express herself in ways
that were likely to be understood by others at the school; clearly, the fact that the plaintiff was transgender was relevant to both her expressive intent and to how her expression was understood by others.207 Instead, what is puzzling about the court’s reasoning
is that it suggests that the plaintiff’s transgender identity was, in effect, a necessary
element of her claim.208 The court seems to have concluded that but for the plaintiff’s
transgender identity, the wearing of the gender-nonconforming clothes would have
been nothing more than a “personal preference” and therefore not protected speech.209
But there is no logical or doctrinal reason why, for example, a cisgender heterosexual male student who wears “female clothing” in order to question gender-related
social norms and expectations should be denied free speech protections because he
does not identify as transgender (or as gay). It may very well be that both the intent and
the message behind the wearing of what is perceived to be gender-nonconforming
clothing is more clear when the plaintiff is transgender. But that does not mean that
only certain individuals, depending on their gender identity, can use clothing to
express constitutionally protected messages. To put it differently, there are cases that
fall between using clothing to express merely a “personal preference” (which may
203
204
205
206
207
208
209

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at *1, *3 (emphasis added).
Id. at *3.
Id.
See id.
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not be constitutionally protected speech)210 and those involving transgender individuals. Those cases might involve not only cisgender students, but also gender-nonbinary
students who do not identify as transgender or as either male or female. In this context, there is no reason to limit the free speech protections to those who identify in
certain predetermined ways.211 How individuals identify according to sex, gender,
and sexuality categories should not preclude them from raising viable free speech
challenges to policies and practices that require them to perform or express their gender
in certain stereotypical and socially privileged ways.
It is true, of course, that some students might wear gender-nonconforming clothing
to school to try to be funny or to cause disruption rather than to convey a particularized message. But what should distinguish protected from unprotected speech in this
context is the intent of the speaker, and the extent to which the message is likely to
be understood by others, rather than whether the speaker, for example, identifies as
male or female or cisgender or transgender or gender nonbinary. In other words,
what should matter is the content of the expression, and how it is understood by
others, rather than the identity categories of the person engaging in the expression.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also failed to recognize a continuum of possible expressive circumstances related to how individuals communicate
gender-related messages through how they dress in Zalewska v. County of Sullivan.212
210

See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 613–14 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that “for many, the
wearing of long hair is simply a matter of personal taste or the result of peer group influence”
and is therefore not protected speech under the First Amendment); see also Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507–08 (1969) (citations omitted) (noting that speech
protected by the First Amendment involving a prohibition against students wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War was different from cases “relate[d] to [the] regulation of
the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deportment”).
211
The question of what role speaker identity should play in determining the scope of free
speech protections is a complicated one. For example, the Supreme Court, in explaining its
highly controversial ruling in Citizens United v. FEC, which struck down campaign financing
limits imposed on corporations and unions, stated that “the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.” Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010). But, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the Court
in a variety of contexts [has] held that speech can be regulated differentially on account of the speaker’s identity, when identity is understood
in categorical or institutional terms. The Government routinely places
special restrictions on the speech rights of students, prisoners, members
of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and its own employees. When such
restrictions are justified by a legitimate governmental interest, they do
not necessarily raise constitutional problems.
Id. at 420–21(Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
The general question of what role speaker identity should play in determining the scope
of free speech rights is beyond the scope of this Article. My point here is simply that how
individuals identify according to sex, gender, and sexuality categories should not preclude them
from raising viable free speech challenges to policies and practices that require them to perform or express their gender in certain stereotypical and socially privileged ways.
212
316 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2003).
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The female plaintiff in that case, who preferred to wear skirts to work, challenged
her public employer’s policy of requiring all employees to wear a uniform that
included pants.213 The employer claimed that the uniform was meant to “project an
overall positive appearance for the County” and that pants were safer on the job than
skirts because the latter might get caught on work-related equipment.214 In rejecting
the free speech claim, the court concluded that “the ordinary viewer would glean no
particularized message from appellant’s wearing of a skirt rather than pants as part
of her uniform.”215 In doing so, the court distinguished Doe v. Yunits on the ground
that “the plaintiff’s dress [in that case] was an expression of his clinically verified
gender identity.”216
Zalewska is another example of the inability of some courts to recognize free
speech rights in matters related to dress and expressive conduct unless the plaintiff
identifies—or is “clinically” identified—in certain ways.217 This is problematic because,
as in Jespersen v. Harrah Operating Co., Inc.,218 the court allowed the absence of
a requisite identity to blind it from the fact that when an employee is required to
abide (or prohibited from abiding) by gender-specific expectations, there may very
well be an underlying viable free speech (or equality) claim regardless of how the
plaintiff identifies.219
To put it differently, Zalewska is another example of Flynn’s “pink on pink”
phenomenon.220 The fact that skirts are traditionally worn by women served to occlude
from the court the fact that the plaintiff’s wearing of skirts, when all employees were
required to wear pants, was a form of gender nonconformity, the prohibition of
which, at the very least, merited scrutiny under the First Amendment.221 As Flynn explains, “Zalewska, like Jespersen, sacrificed her job rather than conform to a gender
213

Id. at 317.
Id.
215
Id. at 320.
216
Id. (emphasis added).
217
Id.
218
444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
219
See Flynn, supra note 66, at 502 (“The facts of Zalewska . . . belie the notion that the
employee’s message was not understood. Zalewska’s initial objection—combined with her
special order of a skirted uniform and her subsequent refusal to return it, followed by her suspension for insubordination—leaves little doubt that her message was clearly communicated
and understood.”); Jessica A. Moldovan, Note, Authenticity at Work: Harmonizing Title VII with
Free Speech Jurisprudence to Protect Employee Authenticity in the Workplace, 42 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 699, 740 (2019) (“In a workplace context where skirts were forbidden,
Zalewska represented the nonconformist the First Amendment typically protects.”).
220
See Flynn, supra note 66, at 501 (arguing the result in Jespersen was a result of the
“pink on pink” phenomenon).
221
See Moldovan, supra note 219, at 740 (“In Zalewska, the Second Circuit allowed
traditional gender norms to influence its analysis—Zalewska’s dress was somehow less communicative because women typically wear skirts—while also ignoring that this position placed
Zalewska as an outsider in her specific work environment.”).
214
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presentation at odds with her identity. The difference in outcome from Yunits is that
Pat Doe’s gender identity was easy for the court to ‘read’ because it stands out in contrast to the background norm.”222
The crucial role that a specific identity category played in the success of the free
speech claim in Yunits stands in contrast to the failure of such a claim in Youngblood
v. School District of Hillsborough County, a case that also involved a public school
student’s challenge to a gender-based clothing policy.223 The plaintiff in Youngblood
was a female seventeen-year-old high school senior who showed up for her yearbook photograph session wearing a jacket, shirt and tie, only to be informed that:
A decades-old [school] policy requir[ed] all female students,
without exception, to wear a revealing, scooped neck drape for
their senior portraits. The drape is made of silky material and is
furnished to each female student by the company hired to take
the senior photos. Wearing the drape requires a female student
to bare her neck, shoulders, and a portion of her chest.224
In contrast, the school allowed male students to “wear regular business or professional attire, namely, a white shirt and dark jacket and tie of their choosing[,]” an
option that obviously did not require them to expose either their shoulders or
portions of their chests.225 “Forced to choose between dressing in girls’ clothing or
having no picture in the yearbook, Youngblood chose the latter.”226
Youngblood sued in federal court arguing that the school abridged her rights to free
speech and discriminated against her on the basis of sex.227 In making her First Amendment claim, Youngblood contended “that she has a constitutionally protected right
to express her view that female students are entitled to equal dignity, freedom, and respect and should not be required to conform to archaic gender stereotypes as a
condition of participating in school activities.”228 But unlike Doe, who emphasized
her transgender status and her “gender identity disorder” diagnosis throughout the
222

Flynn, supra note 66, at 502.
Youngblood v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cty., No. 8:02-cv-1089-T-24MAP (Fl. Dist.
Ct. Sept. 24, 2002).
224
Appeal on Behalf of Appellant/Plaintiff Nicole Youngblood of a Final Order of the Dist.
Court for the Middle Dist. of Fla. at 2, Youngblood v. School Bd. of Hillsborough Cty. (11th
Cir. May 2, 2003) (No. 02-15924-CC) [hereinafter Youngblood, Appeal of Final Order].
225
Id.
226
Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under the Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS 7 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006). Another high school in the same district had required
graduating female students to wear skirts or dresses under their graduation gowns, but decided
to allow them to choose to wear pants after two female students threatened to sue. Marilyn
Brown, Change in Graduation Rule Suits Seniors Just Fine, TAMPA TRIB., May 24, 2002, at 1.
227
Currah, supra note 226, at 10.
228
Youngblood, Appeal of Final Order, supra note 224, at 18.
223
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litigation, Youngblood’s attorneys did not raise an identity-based claim other than to
explain that their client was a young woman who liked to wear “masculine” clothes.229
In doing so, the attorneys explained that Youngblood “preferred boyish clothing and
has had a masculine demeanor. Nicki was a tomboy in grade school and continues
to be a masculine or, as some might term it, ‘mannish’ woman.”230 As Paisley Currah
notes, “Youngblood’s advocates were not able to describe her long history of gender
nonconformity as a medical condition or even as an identity, as Doe’s attorneys had
done, respectively, with their reliance on Doe’s GID [gender-identity disorder] diagnosis and her ‘transgender status.’”231
It seems clear that, despite Youngblood’s inability to check the transgender
identity box, her insistence in wearing so-called male clothing sent a particularized
message questioning gender roles and expectations. As her attorneys explained,
[I]t is precisely because permitting her to appear in the yearbook
without wearing a drape would be understood by others to communicate a particularized message (that women do not have to
conform to gender stereotypes) that the Defendants would not
allow her to do so, based on their countervailing belief that women
should conform to gender stereotypes and their desire to silence
her opposing point of view.232
It also seems clear that Youngblood’s message of questioning gender expectations
and stereotypes was understood by others, as reflected in the fact that the school went
so far as to publish the yearbook without including her picture or even her name.233 The
school, in other words, preferred to leave Youngblood out of the yearbook altogether
rather than include a photograph of her in gender-nonconforming clothing.234
From a free speech perspective, Youngblood and her message that women should
not be forced by public school officials to abide by gender stereotypes through
mandated gender-conforming clothing were literally silenced and erased through her
exclusion from the yearbook.235 And yet, the court rejected the First Amendment claim
229

Currah, supra note 226, at 10.
Youngblood, Appeal of Final Order, supra note 224, at 2–3.
231
Currah, supra note 226, at 10. Although Youngblood identified herself as a lesbian to the
press, her legal filings did not refer to either her sexual orientation or her gender identity. See
Marilyn Brown, Gay Teen Sues School Over Yearbook Photo, TAMPA TRIB., June 20, 2002, at 1.
232
Youngblood, Appeal of Final Order, supra note 224, at 21.
233
Currah, supra note 226, at 7. The school district’s attorney, in a statement to the press,
seemed to concede that Youngblood’s expressed interest in wearing a shirt and tie for the yearbook picture did, in fact, send a message that was understandable by others. As the attorney
put it, “[t]he administration did not feel the yearbook was the place to make those kinds of
statements. The next year, you might have 10 boys dressing as girls and vice versa.” Melanie
Ave, A Portrait of Conflict, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at 1B.
234
Currah, supra note 226, at 7.
235
Id.
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concluding that there was “no constitutionally protected right involved” because “the
right to wear a particular type of clothing for senior portraits does not inherit the protection of the First Amendment.”236 As Currah notes, the different outcomes in Yunits
and Youngblood “suggest why, in cases that could be articulated either way, transgender
rights advocates often rely on more seemingly fixed categories such as transgender
or gender identity than on concepts apparently less anchored to identity categories,
such as gender expression.”237
It bears noting that the court in Yunits not only prioritized the plaintiff’s transgender identity when analyzing the free speech aspects of the case, but it also did the
same when addressing the question of whether the application of the school’s genderbased clothing policy to the plaintiff constituted discrimination because of sex.238
The court, for purposes of the preliminary injunction, answered that question in the
affirmative because the application of the school’s sartorial policy revealed impermissible gender stereotyping.239 In rejecting the school’s contention that “gender-specific
school dress codes have been upheld in the face of challenges based on gender
discrimination and equal protection because the codes serve important governmental
interests,” the court emphasized that it could not “allow the stifling of plaintiff’s
selfhood merely because it causes some members of the community discomfort.”240
As it did when assessing the plaintiff’s free speech claim, the court here reasoned
that the viability of her equality claim based on gender nonconformance depended
on the way in which she self-identified as a transgender person.241 It is reasonable
to assume, given the court’s reasoning, that the school’s exclusion of a non-transgender
student for wearing gender-nonconforming clothing would not have constituted sex
discrimination because it would not have been an effort to stifle the “plaintiff’s
selfhood.”242 But, as with the free speech issue, there is no logical or doctrinal reason
to conclude that a school’s gender-based sartorial policy reflects impermissible
gender stereotyping only when applied to transgender students.
A similar unfortunate and unnecessary judicial prioritization of particular identity
categories can be found in a gender-nonconforming speech case, McMillen v. Itawamba
County School District, that raised issues of sexual orientation rather than gender
identity.243 Mississippi school officials in McMillen prohibited a self-identified lesbian
high school senior from bringing her girlfriend (also a student at the school) to the
prom as her date; at the same time, administrators made it clear that the two young
236

Youngblood v. School Bd. of Hillsborough Cty., No. 8:02-cv-1089-T-24MAP (Fl.
Dist. Ct. Sept. 24, 2002), at 5, 8.
237
Currah, supra note 226, at 13.
238
Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *6–7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11,
2000).
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Id.
240
Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
241
Id. at *6.
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Id.
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702 F. Supp. 2d 699, 701 (N.D. Miss. 2010).
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women would be permitted to attend the prom if they chose male dates.244 Officials
also prohibited the plaintiff from wearing a tuxedo to the prom, explaining that
“only boys were allowed to wear tuxedos.”245
The plaintiff sued in federal court alleging that the school violated her First Amendment rights.246 After being presented with a motion for a preliminary injunction that
would allow the plaintiff to bring a same-sex date to the prom while wearing a tuxedo
as the lawsuit was pending, the court concluded that there was a substantial likelihood that she would succeed on the merits.247 In addressing the sartorial question in
particular, the court noted that “Constance [the plaintiff] requested permission to wear
a tuxedo, or even pants and a nice shirt, to her prom with the intent of communicating to the school community her social and political views that women should not be
constrained to wear clothing that has traditionally been deemed ‘female’ attire.”248
One would think that the evidence regarding the plaintiff’s purpose of expressing
a particular viewpoint through her clothing (and through the bringing of a same-sex
date to the prom) would be enough to at least satisfy the intent requirement that courts
traditionally demand before deeming expressive conduct to be protected speech under
the First Amendment.249 But that was not enough for the court.250 Instead, the court
proceeded to point to the plaintiff’s identity as a lesbian as an additional crucial
factor in establishing the protected nature of her speech.251 As the court explained,
244

Id. School officials informed the plaintiff that she and her girlfriend “could attend with
two guys as their dates but could not attend together as a couple.” Id.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 702.
247
Id. at 702–05.
248
Id. at 704.
249
The McMillen court noted that:
The United States Supreme Court has held that “[i]n deciding whether
particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring
the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood
was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”
Id. (internal reference and quotations omitted).
The court in Fricke v. Lynch, concluded that the bringing of a male date to the prom by a
gay male student constituted expressive conduct protected by the Free Speech Clause. 491 F.
Supp. 381, 385 (D.R.I. 1980) (“I believe Aaron’s testimony that he is sincerely—although perhaps not irrevocably—committed to a homosexual orientation and that attending the dance with
another young man would be a political statement. While mere communicative intent may not
always transform conduct into speech, [it is] clear that this exact type of conduct as a vehicle for
transmitting this very message can be considered protected speech.” (citations omitted)). Given
the fact that the Fricke court emphasized the relevance of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation to his
free speech claim, it is fair to ask whether it would have been prepared to uphold the First
Amendment claim had the plaintiff identified as a heterosexual or if he had not self-identified
according to distinct sexual orientation categories at all. See id.
250
McMillen, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 702–03, 706.
251
Id. at 705.
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The record shows Constance has been openly gay since eighth
grade and she intended to communicate a message by wearing
a tuxedo and to express her identity through attending [the] prom
with a same-sex date. The Court finds this expression and communication of her viewpoint is the type of speech that falls
squarely within the purview of the First Amendment.252
It seems clear from this reasoning that the plaintiff’s self-identification as a lesbian
played a critical role in rendering her proposed expression constitutionally protected.
Such reasoning is not problematic so long as there is a clear understanding, which
the court’s ruling failed to articulate, that no particular sexual orientation identity
should be a required component of successfully making out an expressive conduct
claim based on gender nonconformance. A cisgender female straight or a gender nonbinary asexual student (only two of many possible examples) who wants to bring a
female date to the prom and to wear a tuxedo in part to challenge conventional gender
understandings and expectations should receive the same type of free speech protection that the court in McMillen was prepared to provide the lesbian plaintiff in
that case.253 What should ultimately matter is the message that the expressive conduct
sends, and how it is understood by others, rather than how the speaker identifies according to particular and distinct, sex, gender, and sexuality identity markers.
IV. LOOKING BEYOND FIXED IDENTITY CATEGORIES
The last two parts of the Article have argued that a proper understanding of
gender-nonconformance law, in both its equality aspects254 and free speech components,255 should not make particular identities essential elements of viable claims.
While I have sought to de-emphasize the link between equality protections and distinct
identity categories, other scholars, in exploring the intersection of free speech and
equality as it pertains to LGBT rights claims in particular, have done the opposite.256
For example, Nan Hunter, in an important law review article published in 2000, has
252

Id. (emphasis added).
The court ultimately decided not to issue a preliminary injunction requiring the school
to allow the plaintiff to attend the school-sponsored prom with the date and clothing of her
choice because a group of parents had already organized a “private prom” to which all students
at the school had been invited to attend. According to the court, the availability of the private
prom made it unnecessary for it to order that the plaintiff be included in a school-sponsored
prom before the culmination of the litigation. Id. at 706.
254
See discussion supra Part II.
255
See discussion supra Part III.
256
See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Hunter, Expressive Identity]; Nan Hunter, Identity,
Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1696 (1993) [hereinafter Hunter, Identity, Speech,
and Equality].
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argued that many late-twentieth century sexual orientation (and race) discrimination
cases were grounded in notions of expressive identity.257 Hunter explained that:
Expressive identity is a product of identity politics, an outgrowth
of a series of equality claims. These claims are made, often by and
through law, not on behalf of a voluntarist group that expresses
an ideology, but on behalf of a group defined by an identity which
is itself expressive. A new equality discourse has shifted from
understanding race and other characteristics as simply inborn
fortuities to seeing them as socialized meanings of communities
and groups.258
According to Hunter,
Identity claims in law arise not merely from a social context in
which a particular group shares a certain history, culture, or status.
Underlying that kind of identity is a shared viewpoint, not a set
of opinions or a viewpoint specific to any particular topic or issue,
but “view-point” in a more literal, basic sense: a shared point of
view(ing), a shared position from which one’s views emerge.259
Hunter proceeded to analyze several important LGBT rights cases, including ones
from the 1970s in which gay student groups at public universities challenged their institutions’ refusal to recognize them.260 Hunter also explored the implications of
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, in which a
unanimous Supreme Court used the First Amendment to shield the private organizers
of the Boston St. Patrick’s Day parade from the application of a sexual orientation antidiscrimination law that would have required them to permit an LGBT group to march
under its own banner.261 As Hunter sees it, these cases revolved around the push by
sexual minorities for equal treatment through demands for rights to express their
identity (which, for Hunter, entails the expression of a shared mode of viewing).262
257

See generally Hunter, Expressive Identity, supra note 256.
Id. at 4–5; see also Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, supra note 256, at 1696 (“Notions of identity increasingly form the basis for gay and lesbian equality claims. Those claims
merge not only status and conduct, but also viewpoint, into one whole. . . . Identity politics
has led to identity speech.”).
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Hunter, Expressive Identity, supra note 256, at 5.
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Id. at 32–34 (exploring cases such as Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); Gay
Lib v. Univ. of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977); Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544
F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976); and Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d
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According to Hunter, particular identities play a crucial role not only within equality
cases, as is largely recognized, but also “in governing the interplay between equality
and expression.”263 This is because
[a] myriad of social forces (including the law itself) produces our
conceptions of what constitutes a distinctive identity. Individuals
who share the characteristics of a status that is socially devalued
also share the point of view(ing) implicated in that social location. An equality claim framed by that kind of minoritized identity communicates, by its very articulation, a message of dissent
from the social devaluation of the identity. Such a challenge is
an expressive identity claim.264
More recently, Jeffrey Kosbie, in explaining how free speech principles can help
protect transgender individuals from the harms engendered by discrimination, has
emphasized identity considerations that are unique to transgender individuals.265 For
Kosbie, free speech principles are relevant to many instances of discrimination
against transgender individuals because “dress and appearance communicate core
aspects of identity.”266 Kosbie adds that “[c]ases built on a free speech theory can
complement antidiscrimination law, emphasizing the relationship between identity
and appearance.”267 Kosbie posits, for example, that transgender individuals have
a free speech right to use bathrooms that match their gender identity because
bathroom use plays an important role in determining how individuals form or craft
their gender identities.268 As Kosbie explains, “Trans people often very consciously
choose to use a particular restroom in order to define and express their identity. Their
masculinity or femininity is constituted through the very act of using the restroom.”269
263

Id. at 54.
Id.
265
Kosbie, supra note 59, at 192–93.
266
Id. at 192.
267
Id. at 251–52 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 197 (“Autonomy includes a core concern
with freedom to choose how we express our identity.”).
268
Id. at 243.
269
Id. at 235–36 (footnote omitted). Danielle Weatherby makes a similar point when she
notes that “the manner in which a transgender student chooses a restroom designated for a
particular sex expresses her unique gender identity.” Weatherby, supra note 65, at 120. Writing
about bathroom access from the context of free speech in schools, Weatherby explains that
[w]hile scholars and judges define [free speech] values differently, the
majority agree that the First Amendment protects a person’s right to express her identity, even when the government or, in this instance, other
children are uncomfortable with that identity. At the essence of a transgender student’s behavior is her attempt to be recognized for her own,
unique identity.
Id. at 126–27 (emphasis added).
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The insights of scholars such as Hunter and Kosbie help explain why courts in
equality and free speech gender-nonconforming cases have relied on identity considerations to rule in favor of LGBT litigants.270 These courts properly recognized
that part of what was at issue in the cases was the rights—whether grounded in
considerations of equality or free speech, or a combination of the two—of sexual
minorities and transgender individuals to express their identities.271 This Article does
not question that reasoning. But it does question the limiting of the protections
afforded by gender-stereotyping equality theory and by free speech principles in
gender-nonconforming cases to certain identity or status-based claims. I believe this
questioning is necessary for both conceptual and practical reasons. Rejecting the
idea that certain identities are, in effect, essential elements of gender-stereotyping
equality claims or of gender-nonconforming free speech cases avoids the problem,
identified by critics of identity politics, of deploying rights arguments in ways that
replicate and essentialize socially constructed identities by presenting them as somehow
natural, fixed, and binary.272
The rejection can also, as a practical matter, help to expand the scope of antidiscrimination protections beyond a finite and predetermined list of easily recognizable and therefore privileged identity categories.273 An understanding of gender as
a form of expressive performance, rather than as a reflection of an underlying
identity that is distinct from that performance, helps to push antidiscrimination law
beyond a mere concern with protecting seemingly fixed, stable, and natural understandings of sex/gender identity categories.274
Once gender is viewed through the lens of performative expression rather than
through that of fixed, finite, and predetermined identities, the normative case for a
more expansive form of gender pluralism becomes stronger. Once we shift lenses,
270

See generally Hunter, Expressive Identity, supra note 256; Kosbie, supra note 59.
See generally Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017);
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599
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See supra notes 93–102 and accompanying text.
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I have argued elsewhere that the LGBT rights movement, having achieved the goal of
marriage equality, should redirect its objectives in ways that seek the recognition of and
protection for gender and sexual fluidity and variability as opposed to distinct identities such
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FUTURE OF LGBT RIGHTS 163 (Carlos A. Ball ed., 2016).
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As Sonia Katyal explains,
[W]ith the advent of Price Waterhouse v Hopkins and its progeny . . .
the law of sex discrimination has moved, appreciably so, toward a focus
on gender performance. Such accounts of gender performativity move
gender from a set of cultural expectations to an intangible form of expression, a performance that is not natural or fixed but mutable, highly
expressive, and transitory.
Katyal, supra note 50, at 436 (footnotes omitted).
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the ultimate objective becomes not to encourage a limited number of marginalized
identities to come out into the open, but instead becomes, consistent with First Amendment principles, to foment the flourishing of as many forms of gender expression as
possible regardless of whether they are linked to or arise from or are consistent with
certain identities such as “female” or “gay” or “lesbian” or “transgender.” In the end,
it is the expressive implications of gender-stereotyping theory that helps, when properly
understood and applied, to delink the equality protections at issue from the existence
of particular identities. Viewed from this perspective, gender-stereotyping theory
can help to expand equality protections by refusing to privilege some sex, gender,
and sexuality identities over others.
The fact that gender-stereotyping theory, properly conceived, holds that it is for
individuals and not for others (including government officials and employers) to
determine how they should perform their gender, makes it easier for individuals to
express their gender in fluid and multiple ways. As we have seen, a proper understanding of gender stereotyping does not look for the expression of particular and
predetermined identities in order to offer them protection; instead, it permits individuals
to perform their gender and sexuality identities (whatever they may be and however
expressed) without fear that state actors and private employers, for example, will
penalize them for their expression.275 In short, the expression-protective component
of gender-stereotyping theory, when properly understood and applied, facilitates a
form of gender and sexuality pluralism that is significantly more expansive than that
heretofore provided by traditional American antidiscrimination law and its rigid and
deterministic focus on protecting a limited number of fixed identities.276
Taylor Flynn has contended that expression-based claims offer potential legal
protection to a broad category of transgender individuals because, she argues, while
equality protections have been largely limited to individuals who have been “diagnosed” as transgender, free speech principles can do more by protecting transgender
individuals who resist the medical model of gender identity.277 In my view, the
expressive implications of gender-stereotyping theory go further: they allow for the
theory to protect not only transgender individuals, regardless of whether they embrace
or reject a medical model of gender identity, but also gender-nonconforming or
gender-variant individuals who do not identify as transgender, or who identify as
gender nonbinary, or who refuse to identify according to gender at all.
275

See discussion supra Section II.A.
See Katyal, supra note 50, at 491 (noting that an identity-based antidiscrimination model
“overlooks the reality of gender expression altogether: that it can be fundamentally different,
and broader, than gender identity alone, and that it encompasses a panoply of behaviors that
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Flynn, supra note 66, at 468 (“[W]hile equality claims tend to rely almost solely on a
medical model of gender identity, expression claims are also suited to non-medicalized claims
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gender identity.”); see also id. at 485 (“My normative aspiration is for advocates to pursue
expression claims both within and outside of a medical model.”).
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The expressive and performative components of gender-stereotyping theory,
which help de-emphasize distinct and fixed identities, are particularly salient given
that a growing number of Americans, especially young ones, are increasingly recognizing the fluidity of gender and sexuality categories.278 For some of these individuals,
even identities that question binarisms (such as “bisexuality” and “transgender”
identities) may be unduly restrictive because they may insufficiently account for the
extent to which gender and sexuality categories are fluid and malleable (and not just
nonbinary).279 This openness to gender variability is reflected, for example, in the
fact that Facebook in 2014 started offering its users more than fifty gender-identity
options, including gender-neutral, androgynous, bi-gender, intersex, gender-fluid,
and transsexual.280 At around the same time, OKCupid, the online dating service, began
278

See Michael Schulman, Generation LGBTQIA, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2013), https://nyti
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allowing users to choose not only among more than fifty gender-identity categories, but
also started offering sexuality identity choices that include—in addition to the traditional categories of straight, lesbian, gay, and bisexual—asexual, demisexual (sexual
attraction driven by emotional attachment), heteroflexible, homoflexible, pansexual
(sexual attraction to individuals of any sex or gender identity), queer, questioning,
and sapiosexual (sexual attraction driven by the intelligence of potential partners).281
The law has been slow to respond to these new expressive manifestations of sex,
gender, and sexuality.282 The most significant response to date has been the recognition by several states of a third gender category.283 More than a dozen states, including Arkansas, California, Maine, Nevada, and Washington, allow individuals to
select “non-binary” or “X” as their sex designation on some official identification
documents such as drivers’ licenses and birth certificates.284
To my knowledge, we do not yet have gender-stereotyping case law involving
alleged discrimination against individuals who express their sex, gender, or sexuality
outside of the male/female, straight/LGB, or cisgender/transgender rubrics. But
given the malleability and fluidity of sex, gender, and sexuality identities expressed
by young people in particular, it is only a matter of time before such cases begin to
appear in law reporters. When that happens, gender-stereotyping theory, properly
understood, can offer the claimants important protection from discrimination.
[of gender] relies on an objective set of criteria, many scholars and scientists have shown that
a determination of sex can be far more complicated than the law readily suggests. Not only
do countless individuals possess characteristics associated with both sexes, but also many
individuals transition from one sex to another, and still other individuals challenge the binary
system altogether.”).
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tation-options/index.html [https://perma.cc/PD3B-WMKJ]. In explaining why some individuals
prefer terms such as pansexual and queer over a term such as bisexual, Genny Beemyn
explains that
[t]hey see bisexual as implying a binary, and they are attracted to individuals who are outside of a gender binary or identify outside of a gender
binary themselves, or they consider bisexuals to be attracted to different
aspects of gender in different people, whereas they are attracted to people
regardless of gender.
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359, 360 (2015)).
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other countries).
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Paisley Currah notes that while transgender litigants and their lawyers frequently
emphasize distinct issues associated with transgender identity as a way of persuading
judges to address the discrimination against and silencing of transgender individuals,
transgender activism in the legislative arena has emphasized not just the need to
protect people on the basis of their transgender status, but more broadly, to protect
all gender-nonconforming and nonbinary individuals.285 In other words, the objective has been to seek protections for individuals in ways that allow them to express
their gender regardless of whether their identities are unique or shared, or whether
they are easily recognizable or not. As one activist explains,
Generally I’m fighting for the gender variant community, which
includes mostly the transgender community. But also anybody
who would be perceived as stepping outside society’s boundary
lines of gender in a strict bigender society of male and female.
And as most informed people know, gender is a wide spectrum
in how people choose to express it.286
Currah explains that his research on the work of activists working on these issues
“suggests that there is a commonly held view that while it might be pragmatic to deploy
‘transgender’ in many advocacy contexts, the legal instantiation of a new identity
category—transgender—is not the ultimate goal of the activists who deploy it.”287
It is interesting to note that many of the bills proposed or passed as a result of
this type of activism do not simply add transgender status as a protected class to civil
rights laws; instead of only emphasizing issues of identity and status, the measures also
seek to protect individuals on the basis of how they perform or express their gender. 288
As Currah notes, “An examination of the actual statutes . . . shows that the language
of identity politics has not been imported into the actual laws activists are fighting
for and that gender expression is almost always included in these laws.”289 Indeed,
when it comes to issues important to the transgender community, “the legislative
achievements thus far have, for the most part, explicitly expanded the legal meaning
of gender to place gender-noncomforming identities and practices on a continuum
of gender, rather than create a new category of a protected class.”290
The way in which accounting for issues of performance and expression serves to
reduce the relevance of distinct identity categories is reflected, for example, in the proposed congressional bill, known as the Equality Act, which would amend several
federal civil rights statutes by explicitly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
285
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287
288
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sexual orientation and gender identity.291 The bill defines the latter as follows: “The
term ‘gender identity’ means the gender-related identity, appearance, mannerisms,
or other gender-related characteristics of an individual, regardless of the individual’s designated sex at birth.”292
This broad definition of gender identity makes clear that the objective is to provide antidiscrimination protection not only to those who identify as transgender
(“gender-related identity”), but also to “appearance, mannerisms, or other genderrelated characteristics” that may be disconnected from, or go beyond, fixed and
recognizable gender identities of potential discrimination plaintiffs.293 As called for
by a proper understanding of gender-stereotyping theory, the Equality Act’s definition
of “gender identity” seeks to unmoor the antidiscrimination protection from any particular identity category.294 All gender-nonconforming or gender-variant individuals,
regardless of whether they identify as transgender, would be protected by federal
antidiscrimination law if Congress enacts the Equality Act.295
Unfortunately, the proposed Equality Act’s definition of “sexual orientation” is not
nearly as capacious—it defines that term to cover only three distinct sexuality identities:
“homosexuality, heterosexuality, [and] bisexuality.”296 This narrow definition of sexual
orientation, which tracks the one contained in almost all existing state civil rights laws
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexuality, excludes the many individuals—
including asexuals, the polyamorous, and others—who do not exclusively view, understand, or express their sexual identity through the lens of gender-based attraction.297
It is interesting to think about why the statutory definition of “sexual orientation” in civil rights laws remains tethered to distinct identity categories in ways that
the definition of “gender identity” is not. This question merits a more rigorous exploration than I can provide here, but one reason may be that more people are
recognizing notions of fluidity, variability, and malleability in matters related to
gender than they are in those associated with sexual orientation; it may be that the
push for transgender equality has led some to reconsider the gender binary in ways
291
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that the push for sexual orientation equality has not (yet?) led them to question the
notion that everyone is either heterosexual, on the one hand, or lesbian, gay, or
bisexual, on the other. In other words, the increased visibility of transgender individuals (and, to a lesser extent, of intersex people)298 may have led to a greater questioning of gender categories as fixed and given identities than the greater visibility
of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals has led to the questioning of stable, predetermined, and binary sexuality identities. It may be that activists have been more successful in challenging the idea of gender as a fixed and binary characteristic than
they have been in doing the same for sexual orientation. It remains to be seen
whether activism under the purposefully pluralistic umbrella of “queer rights” may
eventually lead to more expansive and fluid definitions of “sexual orientation” in
civil rights laws and in the broader society.
Mary Anne Case has raised the concern that the definition of “gender identity” in
measures such as the Equality Act is so broad that judges may find it obscure or confusing.299 Case’s point is well taken and suggests that if the definition becomes part
of federal antidiscrimination law, advocates will have to explain to courts how such a
definition is consistent with the theory of gender stereotyping under Title VII that
judges are already familiar with, one that, when properly understood, disconnects
questions of sex discrimination from whether a plaintiff’s sex, gender, and sexuality
identities fall into a finite and predetermined list of identity categories. It is my hope
that the arguments presented in this Article will help advocates—especially in cases
involving individuals who identify outside of the male/female, straight/LGB, or
cisgender/transgender axes—to persuade employers, policymakers, and courts, that
gender stereotyping can constitute impermissible discrimination—and by, extension,
impose harm—regardless of how the claimant identifies according to sex, gender,
and sexuality markers.
Given the central role that distinct and fixed identity categories has played in
crafting American antidiscrimination law and policy, it likely will be impossible, as
a practical matter, to completely exclude the idea of finite and predetermined identity considerations from the enactment, interpretation, and implementation of civil
rights laws for the foreseeable future. But the expressive implications of genderstereotyping theory show that it is possible to provide individuals with actual and
meaningful antidiscrimination protection regardless of how they identify according
to certain sex, gender, and sexuality markers.
298

I say “to a lesser extent” because, while society is paying more attention to intersex individuals, they do not seem to have reached the level of social visibility currently enjoyed by
transgender individuals as a class. For a discussion of intersex individuals generally, see
JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MATTERS (2012).
299
Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the ‘Personal Best’ of Each Employee: Title
VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and
the Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1366 (2014).

2019]

GENDER-STEREOTYPING THEORY

285

CONCLUSION
For better and for worse, issues of group identity have been inextricably linked
to American antidiscrimination law and policy. A clear understanding of how genderstereotyping theory protects expressive interests, such as the one I have attempted
to provide in this Article, allows us to see how that theory can promote equality in
ways that are delinked from the existence of any given identity. It is the expressionprotecting components of gender-stereotyping theory that allow for the articulation
and implementation of a more pluralistic conception of equality than one that is
tethered to a finite list of privileged identities. The delinking of equality from fixed
identity categories encouraged by gender-stereotyping theory shows that there is no
essential or intrinsic relationship between, on the one hand, affording antidiscrimination
protection and, on the other, the identity categories that have been so central to
American equality law up until now.

